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This thesis investigates to what extent antagonism between Hungary and Romania 
may affect their future relations. The antagonistic elements in their relations are rooted 
in each nation's history and strategic culture. However, since strategic culture is only one 
of a large array of factors determining state behavior, structural realism and other 
pertinent theories are also considered in this examination of contemporary political 
interactions. Western options to deal with the problem are also assessed, in order to 
evaluate the degree to which external powers may be able to constructively influence 
Hungarian-Romanian relations. 
This thesis concludes that Hungarian-Romanian relations will probably improve as 
these states become more deeply integrated into the Western community of nations. This 
improvement may not mean friendship between the two states, but it may entail a better 
working relationship necessitated by a common need to become integrated with the West. 
However, the problems between the two countries may be too deeply entrenched to be 
solved in a generation. Conflict in the form of diplomatic posturing and verbal jousting 
may continue as before, but the threat of armed combat has subsided with the increase 
of Western influence in the region. Accesion 'for 1 
NTIS CRA&I ~ 















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 1 
A. THESIS GOALS .................................... 1 
B. METHODOLOGY .................................... 2 
C. ORGANIZATION OF ARGUMENT ........................ 2 
II. STRATEGIC CULTURE .................................. . 5 
A. HUNGARY ....................................... . 5 
1. An Overview of Hungary's History ....................... . 5 
2. Hungarian Culture and Society ........................... 17 
3. Hungarian Strategic Culture ............................. 21 
a. Belief that they are a Western European nation ............... 21 
b. Calvinist religion a distinguishing factor ................... 22 
c. Hungary is surrounded by antagonistic states and nations ......... 22 
d. Pessimistic attitude toward the intentions and capabilities of 
government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
e. Belief that they are generally non-discriminatory. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24 
f. Tradition of foreign powers influencing domestic politics ......... 25 
g. Belief in a strong bond between Magyars at home and abroad ...... 25 
h. The importance of the village .......................... 26 
B. ROMANIA ......................................... 26 
1. An Overview of Romania's History ........................ 26 
2. Romanian Culture and Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
a. Germans ....................................... 39 
b. Gypsies ....................................... 40 
c. Jews ......................................... 42 
3. Romanian Strategic Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 
a. Intolerant nationalism based upon an inferiority complex ......... 44 
b. Multi-ethnic state characterized by strong ethnic allegiances ........ 44 
c. Traditions of public conformity, passivity and deference to authority .. 45 
d. Winner take all attitude toward domestic politics ............. .45 
e. Traditionally an agricultural nation in which modem industry came 
relatively late . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
f. Fear of external states and great power relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 
g. Questioning of the inviolability of borders .................. 47 
Vll 
III. CONTEMPORARY DOMESTIC POLITICS ...................... .49 
A. HUNGARY ........................................ 49 
1. Hungarian Political Parties ............................ . 50 
2. HSP-AFD Governance ................................ 52 
3. Assessment ...................................... . 55 
B. ROMANIA ........................................ 57 
1. Romanian Political Parties .............................. 58 
2. Extreme Nationalism in Romania .......................... 61 
3. Romanian Politics in Action ............................ 64 
4. Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
IV. CURRENT ISSUES ...................................... 69 
A. BILATERAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS ..................... 69 
B. ECONOMICS ....................................... 74 
1. Hungary ........................................ 74 
2. Romania ........................................ 75 
C. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP ............. 76 
1. NATO .......................................... 77 
2. PFP ........................................... 79 
3. CSCE .......................................... 80 
4. WEU .......................................... 81 
V. CONCLUSIONS ....................................... 83 
A. ASSESSMENT OF PAST TRENDS ......................... 83 
1. Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
2. Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
3. Hungarian-Romanian Relations ........................... 86 
B. PATHS FOR WESTERN INFLUENCE ....................... 87 
1. The United States and NATO ............................ 89 
2. Western Europe .................................... 91 
3. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
4. Russia .......................................... 93 
C. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION ................... 94 
D. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CONFLICT ..................... 97 
Vlll 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 99 




Antagonism has existed between Romania and Hungary at varying intensities for 
a millennium. The province of Transylvania, with its multiethnic population, serves as 
the main catalyst for their modern animosities. The Treaty of Trianon {1920) transferred 
control of Transylvania from Hungary to Romania, and created a minority population of 
nearly two million Magyars {ethnic Hungarians) within the Romanian state. Two principal 
dilemmas have characterized Hungarian-Romanian relations ever since: discrimination 
against minorities within Romania and Hungarian irredentism regarding Transylvania. 
A survey of Hungarian strategic culture reveals several basic characteristics. 
Hungarians are convinced that they belong in the Western group of nations and should 
be promptly admitted to institutions such as NATO and the European Union. The end of 
the Soviet empire has left Hungary without allies. Hungarians view themselves as 
surrounded by hostile nations, and are thus extremely sensitive to regional concerns. 
Finally, the plight of Magyars abroad will remain important to Hungary's national interest 
as long as a strong perception of kinship endures. 
The ideology of discrimination became an integral part of Romanian strategic 
culture during the decades following the Trianon treaty, and has been reinforced by 
governments representing all sides of the political spectrum ever since. For the ethnic 
Romanians, loyalty to their culture is synonymous with loyalty to the state {a highly 
regarded virtue). Meanwhile, the ethnic Romanians view cultural autonomy in the Magyar 
case as being the first step towards the reunification of Transylvania with Hungary. 
Romanians see Hungarian involvement in their minority problems as an intrusion in a 
xi 
sovereign issue and as evidence that Hungary still maintains irredentist designs upon 
Transylvania. Traditions of public conformity, passivity and deference to authority in 
Romania also endanger the future of its democracy. The government's lack of 
institutionalized checks and balances and its inability to control local authorities hamper 
Romania's ability to change. 
The 1994 Hungarian election returned the former communist leaders to power in 
a landslide victory. The new government will probably continue economic reforms, but 
at a much slower pace, and create an environment in which Hungarian-Romanian 
relations may improve. However, Prime Minister Horn, like his predecessor, is too 
politically weak to go against popular sentiment regarding the importance of minority 
issues, despite his party's electoral clout. 
The Romanian political scene is fraught with many problems. The continuing 
escalation of the war of words between Romania's minority and extreme nationalist 
parties blocks any pragmatic approach by the government to correct the social ills of the 
country. While President Iliescu and his political allies represent the moderate element 
in Romanian politics, they are unable to enact needed social reforms without the 
acquiescence of the extreme nationalist faction of the ruling coalition. 
Association with, and eventual full membership in, established security 
organizations such as NATO and the European Union is the main means by which 
Romania and Hungary seek to address their internal problems. Hungarians firmly believe 
that integration with the West, actually re-integration in their minds, will allow the state 
to solve its current economic and security problems, ushering in a new era of prosperity. 
xii 
On the other hand, Romania's political, economic, and social problems (including its 
treatment of minorities) could inhibit Romanian integration into the Western fold. 
The lack of domestic stability prevents both Hungary and Romania from addressing 
the issues dividing them in a spirit of compromise. Acceptance of Hungary and Romania 
into existing Western organizations appears to be the best long-term means of positively 
influencing relations between these two states. Through the exchange of information, 
mutual awareness and understanding can be fostered; and thus the root problems of 
mistrust and discrimination can be resolved. NATO is a Western institution in which U.S. 
influence is unquestioned. The U.S. therefore has a direct means of helping to solve the 
Budapest-Bucharest diplomatic logjam by prompting NATO to accept Hungary into the 
fold. Integration of Romania into NATO should also occur promptly, when that state is 
ready, but Hungarian integration should not be delayed solely for fear of possible 
Romanian complaints. 
Hungarian-Romanian relations will probably improve as these states become more 
deeply integrated into the Western community of nations. Conflict in the form of 
diplomatic posturing and verbal jousting may continue as before, but the threat of armed 
combat has subsided with the increase of Western influence. However, armed conflict 
approaching civil war within Romania remains possible. If such a confrontation occurred, 
the logical source of support for the Romanian Magyars would be Hungary. Thus, as 
long as the possibility of Romanian internal conflict remains plausible, so too 




The tumultuous history of the Balkan region created intense inter- and intra-state 
conflicts throughout East-Central Europe. Romania and Hungary· are two examples of 
this phenomenon. These two states have been at odds with one another since the Middle 
Ages. Many wars occurred between them as a result of centuries under foreign rule. 
The great power politics of Austria, Russia and the Ottoman Empire over control of the 
Balkans often pitted Romania and Hungary against one another as vassal states. The 
nineteenth century witnessed the independence of both nations, yet difficulties 
continued and even intensified. 
The province of Transylvania, with its multiethnic population. serves as a 
catalyst for their modern animosities. One consequence of the First World War was the 
shifting of Transylvania from Htmgarian to Romanian control. Nearly two million 
ethnic Hungarians became minority citizens within the Romanian state. Since then. 
Hungarian - Romanian relations have been characterized by t\:vo principal dilemmas. 
First, discrimination against, and even persecution of. minorities within Romania is 
V>'ell documented. Hungary considers itself the champion of all etlmic Htmgarians 
\vithin tl1e region. and therefore abhors Romanian minority policies. However. the 
Romanians perceive this stam.--e as interference in their sovereignty. Hence the second 
issue. Romanians believe that Hungarian irredentism regarding the lost province of 
Transylvania persists to the present. They are very skeptical of all Hungarian initiatives 
as a result. 
A. THESIS GOALS 
This tl1esis investigates to what extent animosity bet\veen tl1ese nations may 
affect their future relations. An exan1ination of the causes of tension and of government 
reactions and counter-reactions. follo\\'ed by an analysis of current efforts to resolve the 
issues. is undertaken. A study of each nation's history and strategic culture should 
reveal the fotmdations of tl1eir mutual anxieties toward one another. Since strategic 
cultural study is far from being an exact scientific discipline. and since strategic culture 
is only one of a large array of factors determining state behavior. structural realism and 
other pertinent theories are also considered in this examination of contemporary 
political interactions. Finally. an assess111ent of \Vestern options to deal with the 
problem is included in the conclusion. One of the key purposes of this thesis is to 
evaluate the degree to which external powers may be able to constructively influence 
Hungarian- Romanian relations. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines Hungarian-Romanian relations at the state and sub-state 
levels. The scholarly methodolog_y consists of an extensive survey and qualitative 
analysis of historical materials. official documents and current press reports. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF ARGUl\1ENT 
There are three key elements to understanding future bilateral relations: 1 l 
where each state has been. 2J v.•here each currently stands. and 3l where each wishes to 
go. History sheds light on tl1e first element. but gives little insight to tl1e other two. 
Current news and intelligence reports answer the second while a state's national interest 
as articulated in policies or actions reveals tl1e third. However, by studying strategic 
culture. we learn \Vhat effect history and culture have had and potentially will have on a 
counti)·'s policy making. An assessment of Htmgai)·'s and Romania's strategic culture. 
contemporai)· problems. and professed national interests can yield reasonable 
judgments about the probable course of their future relations. A nation's strategic 
culture derives from its geographical circumstance. political culture, and most 
importantly its histoi)' .1 It is therefore logical to begin with separate examinations of 
the Hungarian and Romanian strategic cultures in order to establish a common 
understanding of where each state has been. and provide a backdrop in which 
con temporal)' decisions are made. 
Next. a thorough comprehension of each state's domestic politics is essential in 
tmderstanding current international maneuvering. Culture helps to explain distinctive 
approaches to problems. but such patterns can also be explained by the interactions of 
institutions and power elites.: According to Kenneth \Valtz's structural realist theoi)·. 
1Ken Booth. "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed: \Vhat is Strategic Culture?'', in Strategic Power: 
USA'USSR. ed. Carl G. Jacobsen. (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 121. 
='Jack Snyder. "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor," in Strategic Power: USAI\JSSR. ed. 
Carl G. Jacobsen. (London: Macmillan. 1990). p. 7. 
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whether these institutions are themselves affected by culture is insignificant, because 
once governments are established, the workings of the international s:ystem as a whole 
limit the amount of possible policy deviation from accepted norms. The system 
punishes non-conformers, according to structural realist theory. 3 The question is, how 
much deviation is accepted before other states condemn one's actions? Since the limit is 
constantly changing and may not be apparent short of war or confrontation. political 
groups can espouse very radical agendas and still gamer main stream support. Thus, 
political parties from all points on the spectrum can influence their state's behavior in 
three crucial ways: by forcing the ruling government to follov.· less moderate agendas in 
order to capitalize upon public sympathies. through scaring other states by revealing 
radical attitudes or tendencies, and through actual governance. An appreciation of the 
political environment from which the Bucharest and Budapest governments hail is 
necessary in order to discern their potential future policies. 
Once the political attitude and posturing of each state is firmly established, a 
look at the current issues between them is in order. Each issue will be scrutinized, and 
an appraisal made as to possible future courses they could take in light of Hungarian 
and Romanian attitudes. national interests and international constraints. A look at 
incentives for cooperation as well as incentives to capitalize upon grievances shall be 
made. After assessing past trends and possible future paths. suggestions will be made 
as to ho\\' the \Vest can positively influence Hungarian - Romanian relations in the 
coming century. The events in the former Yugoslavia have shown the world that the 
most effective means of quelling nationalist discontent is before an actual conflict 
erupts. The cosmopolitan nature of Transylvania and the traditional discord between 
Romania and Hungary could ignite more Balkan violence and a potential region wide 
conflict. Therefore. peaceful solutions to their problems are of vital importance to the 
\Vest and the international community as a v.·hole. 
-"\.Valtz. Kenneth N. "Anarchic Orden. and Balances of PO\ver." in ~eorealism and its Critics. ed. Robert 
0. Keohane. <New York: Columbia University Press, 1986!. 
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ll. STRATEGIC CULTURE 
All governments make decisions based upon their unique perceptions of the 
world. This individuality, called strategic culture, is the result of a nation's traditions, 
values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits. symbols, and achievements. This culture 
derives from political and historical experiences as well as geographical factors. 
Strategic culture is personified in the attitudes and behavior of a nation's political elite, 
including politicians and the military establishment and their views regarding public 
opinion. It represents one factor that helps determine how a nation interacts with others 
in the security field. 4 
The study of strategic culture is a tool for identifying subtle differences in the 
behavior of states, and ho\\' these differences condition the strategic environment.5 
Understanding the differences in how nations are likely to view various situations and 
react to them is of "great importance" to strategic thinking." Cultural study adds to the 
general knowledge of state relations by avoiding ethnocentrism. contributing to an 
appreciation of the behavior of others, underlining the importance of history. and by 
helping to explain "irrationalities in the thinking and behavior of those not socialized in 
the cultural traditions of the observer."~ In short. society represents the foundation 
upon which states rest. A basic knowledge of a society is essential in tmderstanding that 
state's politics. Its accompanying culture directly affects the actions of its leaders. For 
example. culture may limit tl1e range of options acceptable to the society. Thus, 
strategic culture represents an influencing factor upon international decision making. 
A. HVNGARY 
1. An Overview of Hungary's History 
The ethnically mi.xed people who originally inhabited the Hungarian plains were 
conquered by the Magyars. who liwd along tl1e Don river in southern Russia until this 
4Booth. p. 1 ::!1 . 
5Yitzhak Klein. "A Theory of Strategic Culture." Comparatiw Strategv. Vol. 10, No. 1. 1991. pp. 14-
15. 
EAndrew \V. Marshall. "Strategy a& a Profession for Future Generations." in On Not Confusing 
Ourselves: Essavs on National Securitv Strategv in Honor of Albert and Roberta \Vohlstetter. ed. Andrew 
W. J\·1arshall. J .J. Martin. and HenryS. Rowen. (Boulder: \Vestview Pre&s. 1991 l. p. 310. 
7Bootll. p. 124. 
5 
-----~-~~~--~-~----------_j 
time. The Magyars quickly imposed their language and culture upon their predecessors. 
and also managed to incorporate the Turkic Cumans who invaded in the thirteenth 
century. The Magyars were largely nomadic pastoral people at this point in history. 
Their raids into surrounding lands ended after a crushing defeat at the hands of the 
Saxon King Otto I near Augsburg in 955. 
Hungary's first king, Stephen I (997 - 1038), united the region. Under his reign 
the Hungarian plain was agriculturally tamed and the nomadic lifestyle began to fade. 
Magyars thoroughly dominated the kingdom. although many Slavs populated the region 
as well. Stephen used his power and influence to convert the population and bring them 
into the Roman Catholic Church. He was later canonized for his role. This action 
served to bring Hungary into the European community of nations. Catholic Hungary 
proved invaluable to \\lestern Europe in the following century when it acted as a shield 
against the invading Mongols who dominated Russia and the East. 
Another Hungarian ethnic group appeared around the time of Saint Stephen. 
The Szekely people, who lived in Transylvania and the nearby Carpathian Mountains. 
are closely related to the ~1agyars and speak a language nearly· identical to that found 
on the plain. Their origins are clouded. Modern Szekelys prefer to believe that they are 
the descendants of early Magyars sent out to protect Hungary by guarding the mountain 
passes. Magyar and Szekely history diYerge throughout the 1\-liddle Ages in the sense 
that they \\'ere not always engaged in the same conflicts nor were they always allied. 
However. by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries they had become so 
closely associated with the Magyars that they were usually combined with the Mag_yars 
as one etlmic group in censuses. This practice continued until the 1980s. For our 
purposes. the Szekely and Transylvanian Mag_yars will be treated as a single ethnic 
group since they have shared the same experiences for over a century. s 
The two centuries following Stephen's reign were marked by Mag_yar expansion 
into present day Croatia and Bosnia. After defeating Mongol invasions and internal 
anarchy. expansion continued into Serbia. Bulgaria and \Vallachia. The Hungarian 
Kingdom \\'as now reaching its zenith (it would soon have to contend with Turkish 
interest in the Balkans). but the kingdom's impact upon the region was already· made. 
Magy·ars were now thoroughly dispersed throughout the Balkans. 
~~onnan J. G. Pounds. Easteri1 Europe. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company. 1969J. pp. 47-48. 
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The Turks invaded Europe in 1345 and again in 1354. The latter date marked 
the beginning of a Balkan occupation that continues today, albeit on a smaller scale. 
Thrace, Bulgaria and Serbia had fallen to Turkish power V>'ithin a decade of the 
invasion, but Ottoman expansion then stalled. The campaign up the Danube resumed in 
the sixteenth century under the Sultan Suleiman. In 1526, the Hungarian kingdom 
disintegrated after the defeat and death of their king. Louis II, at the Battle of Mohacs. 
Ferdinand, lord of the German Habsburg lands and cousin of Louis II. was promptly 
elected king of Hungary and Bohemia. Ferdinand and his brother Charles V. the Holy 
Roman Emperor, continued to war with the Turks in an attempt to reclaim the lost 
Hungarian lands. However, religious tensions v.·ithin Charles' empire forced the 
brothers to finally accept a peace in 1547 that recognized Ottoman possession of the 
greater part of their conquests. 9 Hungary was thus divided into three parts. The 
Austrian Habsburgs and Ottoman Turks each received a portion of the cotmtry while 
Transylvania became an autonomous province under Ottoman suzerainty. although a 
Hungarian dynasty nominally reigned. The Turks retained possession of the Hungarian 
plain well into the eighteenth century. ': 
"The Turkish impact on the lands which tl1ey occupied was almost wholly 
negative." 11 The Ottomans had conquered the area for political and financial reasons. 
Their am1ies \\'ere garrisoned tluoughout the region to maintain order. but few Turks 
came to the area to settle. In fact. the actual number of Turks within the region \\'as so 
small that only the trade routes and metropolitan areas were effectively controlled. 
while tl1e mountains and wilderness remained under the .iurisdiction of local tribes. 
Merchants and tax collectors from Asia ~Enor. many of whom were Greek and Jewish. 
exploited the area economically with the help of the military. Christianit)' was tolerated 
under the Moslems. with an insignificant number converting to Islam within Hungary. 
The main influences of the Ottoman reign in Hungary were the destruction of its 
sovereignty and the stit1ing of economic development for several centuries. 1:2 
l'v1eanwhile. the Thirty Years \Var (1618 - 48 l significantly altered the political 
and religious structure of Habsburg Hungary. Jean Cah·in. the French theologian. led 
religious thought down a new path during the Protestant Reformation. His doctrine of 
'\Vallace K. Ferguson and Geoffrey Bruun. A Sun·ev of European Civilization. (Cambridge: Houghton 
:l\·1ifflii1 Company. 1952), pp. 204. 255.425 · 26. 
1c'Pounds. p. 48. 52. 
1 1Ibid .. p. 48. 
12Ibid. 
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Calvinism emphasized predestination, the sovereignty of God, the supreme authority of 
the Scriptures, and the irresistibility of God's influence within man that strengthens his 
actions. The war began when Czech-Calvinists in Bohemia revolted against the 
Habsburg rulers who threatened their religious and national freedom. The conflict v.·as 
fmally settled at the Peace of Westphalia (1648). This peace was a turning point in 
European history. The granting of sovereignty to states that formerly made up the Holy 
Roman Empire gave birth to the modem nation-state. and an international system based 
upon territorial aggrandizement. For Hungary, the dissolution of the Empire's power 
forced the Habsburgs to rely upon their own hereditary lands, and their policies 
increasingly became Austro-centric. Religion, the original cause of the war. was nearly 
forgotten by the war's end .13 Ninety percent of the population of Hungary followed 
Protestant creeds by the end of the si.xteenth century. 14 They were now free to worship 
as they chose. 
Turkish domination receded by the end of the seventeenth century. A siege of 
Vienna was lifted in 1683, prompting a string of Austrian victories. The Hungarian 
fortress of Buda (modem Budapest) was freed three years later. By 1717 the Christians 
laid siege to the Serbian fortress of Beograd. marking the end of Turkish control over 
the Hungarian plain. Peace was fmally established at Passarowitz the following year. 
Transylvania was politically reunited with the Habsburg lands. including Hungary. 
Thus, victory over the Turks was bittersweet. The Magyars and other ethnic groups had 
traded one overlord for another. Life under the Christian Habsburgs was more 
palatable. but the Habsburg rule was a precarious one. maintained by playing one 
ethnic group against another. ::-
The Austrian Empire under the Habsburgs \"~/as the most conservative of the 
great pov.•ers. The empire was dominated by the landed aristocracy who went 
unchallenged due to the lack of a developed middle class. The majority of the 
population were peasants with only a very small number of merchants, businessmen 
and manufacturers. The various ethnic groups within the empire were theoretically 
represented by provincial diets or "estates" dating back to medieval times. but these 
groups rarely met and had no recognizable influence. Vienna controlled state 
administration through loyal local nobles supplemented by the police, army and 
13 Ferguson. pp. 501- 10. 
14 Peter F. Sugar. A Riston: of Hunga:ry. !Bloomington. I~: Indiana t:-niversity Press. 1990), p. 94. 
15 Pounds. pp. 474- 75. 
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bureaucracy. The provinces were loosely governed in all respects but one. As is true 
with all states, the very goal of Austria was its own perpetuation, which meant that the 
forces of liberalism and nationalism that threatened the delicate underpinnings of the 
state were systematically suppressed .16 
Magyar culture survived under the Austrians despite Germanization attempts. 
The preservation of local medieval institutions helped to defend the people from the 
central authorities. Vienna conceded the creation of a Central Hungarian Diet in 1825 
in order to facilitate central control over the many quasi-government bodies. The Diet 
provided a platform for Stephan Szechenyi, one of the richest men in Hungary. to 
become an early spokesman for nationalist ideals. Szechenyi sought to raise the 
standard of living of the peasantry by bringing Hungary into the modern age. He 
agitated for agricultural modernization, the creation of investment capital to stimulate 
industry, and the abolition of tariff practices which separated Hungary from Austria. 
Some of his proposed measures were enacted. but Szechenyi's real contribution was 
setting the stage for a future confrontation. 
The European wide revolutions of 1848 had profound repercussions within the 
Austrian Empire. A Hungarian nationalist leader and excellent orator named Lajos 
Kossuth took advantage of the situation by making a speech in the Budapest Diet 
denouncing the absolutist system and calling for a constitutionally based government. 
His ideas drew support from the newly emerging middle-class businessmen who felt 
economically handicapped by the central government, and from the peasantry and 
country gentry \vho understood the back\\·ardness of the feudal system then in place. 
On March 13 public demonstrations turned into street fighting which forced the King to 
abandon Metternich. his Chancellor of thirty-nine years and architect of the "divide and 
conquer" strategy used to quell nationalism within the empire. Spurred on by their new 
found influence, the Hungarian patriots circulated a list of demands two days later. 
They advocated a nev: Hungarian constitution that Vlould provide for a national diet 
elected by males with property. civil and religious freedom for all subjects as well as 
freedom of the press. an end to the feudal privileges held by the nobility. and the 
creation of its own ministries of war. finance and foreign affairs, which would make 
Hlmgary completely autonomous within the Austrian Empire. On March 31, the 
1 ~'David Thomson. Europe SinCe Napoleon. (New York: AlfredA. Knopf. Inc .. 1957), p. 110. 
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government in Vienna agreed to all of these reforms in an effort to salvage the 
empire. 17 
The increased status of Hungary within the empire failed to please everyone. 
Slavs reacted to the proposition of a renewed Hnngarian Kingdom by splitting Hungary 
in two. A Slav state was proclaimed, combining the repressed Slavs in Hungary with 
Croats and Serbs in the south. This state also demanded recognition from Vienna. 
Unfortunately, the two nationalist movements allowed Vienna to regain its hold upon 
the region. The Hungarian Diet was dissolved by the emperor and the Magyars were 
soon attacked from three sides; Austria from the north, the Slavs under Count Joseph 
Jellachich to the south. and a Russian force sent by the arch-conservative Tsar Nicholas 
I to the east. Defeated by superior strength, Louis Kossuth and his followers were 
forced to surrender. Hungary remained an Austrian province. 18 
Although the revolutionary movement was quelled in 1848. the widespread 
dissatisfaction with the Vienna government could not be overlooked for long. The 
humiliating defeat to France and numerous Italian Kingdoms during a war over 
Lombardy in 1859 forced the Emperor Francis Joseph to accept change. The provincial 
diets \Vere revived and the Imperial Council ( Reichsra t) was given greater power in a 
move toward constitutionalism. Ho\\'ever. the emperor ultimately refused to accept a 
federalist state structure and so the reforms failed to soothe nationalist tensions. Protest 
movements against the Reichsrat and German domination in general began to spread. 
The rvtag_vars under the direction of Francis Deak (} 803 - 76) became the 
sta1.mchest foes of the regime. Deak differed from the now exiled Kossuth in that he 
believed Hungary could not stand alone as a sovereign state and therefore sought 
reconciliation within the empire on the terms acL>epted in 1848. Austria's defeat by 
Prussia in the short v.•ar of 1866 forced the emperor to concede to the Magyars. 
'Without Magyar support. the Austrian Empire would no longer be a great pmver, if an 
entity at all. So in 1867 the Ausgleich (Compromise) was endorsed, transforming the 
state into a dual monarchy of two equal kingdoms under the same monarch. Each half 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would have its own parliament and civil 
administration, but there would be one army and a joint ministry charged with affairs 
concerning the military. foreign affairs and fmancial matters. The compromise returned 
~"Gordon A. Craig. Europe Since 1815. Alemate Edition. (~ew York: Harcourt. Brace, Jovanovich 
College Publishers. 1974i. pp. 39-40.89-90. 
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a semblance of efficiency to the empire, but failed to solve the nationality crisis: for it 
represented a deal between the German minority in the western part of the empire and 
the Magyar minority in the east. The Czechs, Slovaks. Croats. Serbs. Poles and 
Rumanians had failed to gain their own autonomy. Before the Compromise, nationalist 
movements advocated autonomy within the empire. but aftetvvards they desired total 
independence. 
The Kingdom of Hungary, encompassing roughly the same area as the medieval 
kingdom minus Bosnia and Dalmatia, was governed by a bicameral parliament made up 
of a House of Magnates and a House of Deputies. Parliament V/as not a popular 
assembly, for the franchise was extremely limited by electoral law. As a result of the 
initial franchise, the Magyars dominated all levels of political power despite 
constituting less than half of the 15 million population. The government soon embarked 
upon the assimilation of all other ethnic groups into the Magyar culture. Only the 
Croats in southwestern Hungary had limited representation and education in their own 
language as a result of their service to the empire in 1848. Yet even the Croats began to 
lose some of their identity over the years in the face of Mag_yarizationist policies. The 
suppression of minority language schools. newspapers. and customs took its toll. On 
top of this atmosphere was an increasing :Magyar demand for separation from Austria. 
led by Francis Kossuth. Lajos' son. In 1905 the younger Kossuth's political party won 
an ovenvhelming majority of parliamentary seats. and appeared ready to actually detach 
Hungary from the alliance. F rands Joseph ended these aspirations by threatening to 
grant universal manhood suffrage to the kingdom. Kossuth understood that the Magyar 
oligarchy wo"Lud be eliminated and so he agreed to cancel plans for separation. This 
ensured that Mag_yar control of Hungary would continue. 1:;. 
The murder of the unpopular Habsburg crmvn prince started the chain of events 
leading to the First \Vorld \Var. The empire achieved surprising military success in the 
first year of conflict. It occupied Russian Poland. defeated the Italians at Caporetto and 
took Serbia after Bulgaria joined their cause. Romania attacked Transylvania in 1916 
and \\'as soundly defeated the following year. but by then the burden of war was taking 
its toll. Hungary supplied proportionately more soldiers than other parts of the empire. 
and correspondingly suffered more casualties and economic hardship. Despite these 
problems. the Hungarian parliament remained in power throughout the war. even after 
!~'Craig. pp. 155- 56. 266- 67. 
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the military took effective control of Austrian politics. Tragedy struck in 1916 when 
Francis Joseph died at age 86. The successor, Charles IV, failed to maintain the same 
public support for the war garnered by his father. The empire was crumbling. 
Hungarian society began to disintegrate in 1917 over discontent with the rising 
prices and growing shortages caused by the now unpopular war. Numerous strikes 
occurred, and subjects advocating widespread social reform increased after the 
successful October Revolution in Russia. Meanwhile the non-Magyar population grew 
increasingly restless. These people had loyally backed the empire from the first days of 
the conflict, but the military stalemate and Wilsonian ideals changed their allegiance. 
The minorities realized that true independence could be a byproduct of the war. 'When 
Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire surrendered, Austria-Hungary's defeat became 
inevitable and was acknowledged with Charles' capitulation on October 27. 1918. The 
Czechs, Croats, Slovaks and Ruthenians (Carpatho - Ukrainians) seceded within the 
next three days. 20 This was in line with the tenth of \Vilson' s famous fourteen points. 
v.•hich stated: "The peoples of Austria - Hungary. whose place among the nations we 
wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of 
autonomous development. "21 
On November 16, the Hungarian People's Republic was proclaimed under the 
regime of Count Mihaly Karolyi and his party. Karolyi had \von a political struggle 
with Charles in \vhat is called the Aster Revolution (October 30 ). owing its name to the 
red and white asters used to replace royalist emblems on the soldier's uniforms. 
Attempts to keep Hungary together were unsuccessfuL and the Transylvania Romanians 
joined the Kingdom of Romania. By the beginning of peace talks in January 1919. 
Hungary had already lost more than half of its fonner territory and population. A 
peasant revolt in the countryside added to the Karolyi government's problems. forcing 
them to institute radical social changes. Karolyi' s tenuous political grip gave on March 
21. The Workers' and Soldiers' Councils of Budapest declared a Soviet government 
under a stonemason named Sandor Garbai. with Karolyi's radical political opponent 
Bela Kun as its real head. The short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic was born. 
The great powers refused to accept another socialist government. especially one 
in the proximity of \Vestern Europe. So. with French assurances of aid, the Romanian 
Arnw advanced upon Hungary. A "white" government was simultaneously formed 
:'0SugaT. pp. 291 - 94. 
:: 1Pounds. p. 475. 
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under French protection. The "National Army" under Vice Admiral Miklos Horthy \Vas 
formed by the whites, but was of little consequence. 22 Meanwhile, Bela Kun's only 
hope rested with Lenin's Red Army, but Lenin was deeply involved in his own civil 
war and felt his government too weak to risk sending military support.23 Kun's 
Revolutionary Governing Council was forced to abdicate, and Budapest and the 
majority of Hungary were occupied by the Romanian army. A white terror ensued 
under the national army that now acted independently from the government. During the 
first three months of this counterrevolution, five thousand people were executed and 
nearly seventy thousand were interned in camps. The Romanian army also instituted 
punitive action against the socialist revolutionaries. Chaos engulfed the country. 
By the fall of 1919 the great powers began to pressure the parties involved in an 
effort to get the peace process finished. However, Romania refused to withdraw its 
troops for several reasons. First. Romania feared that the favorable borders established 
in the 1916 Bucharest Agreement wouldn't be guaranteed. Second. the government 
refused to accept treaty clauses guaranteeing minority rights. rejecting them as 
infringements upon their sovereignty. and fmall:y. the Romanian army was continuing 
to expropriate food. machinery. transportation equipment and other goods it considered 
spoils of war. A British diplomatic mission in November 1919 finally established order. 
The Romanians left in March 1920 and Horthy' s national army became the guarantor 
of law and order under a temporary elected civilian government called the National 
Assembly. 
Public opinion Vlithin Hungary \Vas strongly in favor of retaining a monarchy. 
but the great powers declared that no Habsburg would be acceptable as king. 
Nevertheless, H1.mgary was declared to be a kingdom in Law I ( 1 920) of the National 
Assembly. in an effort to establish continuity and thus legitimacy to the nation's future 
government. Since the throne could not be f:tlled, the law had a provision dating to 
medieval times by which the highest office could be held by a regent. Horthy was the 
only possible candidate. Supported by the army at home and Great Britain abroad. he 
assumed the position. The former commander in chief of the Imperial Navy was 
foremost a conservative who feared above all the Soviet Union and revolution. Horthy 
was an astute politician who remained in control by accommodating the far right while 
=
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gaining support from the leftists through his strong defense of Hungari
an sovereignty in 
the face of Hitler's Germany. Mainstream Hungarians were also impas
sioned by 
Horthy's insistence that Hungary return to its former borders. Since the
 law creating 
the regent's office did not stipulate a length of service, over time Horth
y was able to 
persuade the National Assembly to grant him great power, making Horthy a
 virtual 
dictator. 24 
\Vhile Hungarians fought over politics at home, in Paris their future w
as being 
decided. On June 4, 1920, in the Trianon Palace in Versailles, Hungary si
gned the 
formal treaty ending the war. Hungary was reduced from 282,000 squa
re miles to 
93,000. This translated economically to a loss of 89 percent of its iron 
production, 84 
percent of its forests, 62 percent of its railway netv:ork and 44 percent 
of its food-
processing capability .25 Hungary's population \vas also substantially red
uced. In 1910 
the population was 18.25 million of which the Magyars and Szekely ma
de up 54 
percent.26 After Trianon roughly nine million remained. of which 89.5 
percent were 
:rv1agyar. 27 Twenty-eight percent of Hungarian speakers now lived outsi
de the 
Hungarian state. 28 Trianon represented a national humiliation equal to 
the Battle of 
Mohacs in 1526. The discriminatory treatment afforded the Hungarians 
abroad 
deepened Hungarian resentment at home. All economic and social prob
lems within 
Hungary came to be blamed on the un,iust treaty. and the main goal of 
foreign policy 
became its revision. 
The terms agreed to at Trianon also forbade the union of Germany and
 Austria. 
called Anschluss. In March 1938. Adolph Hitler's Third Reich entered Vi
enna and the 
An_.;;chJuss occurred anyway. Julius Gombos. an anti-Semite and fascist 
who became 
Horthy's premier in 1931. \\'as one of the first foreign officials to court
 the Nazis.=~ 
His successors continued the trend out of fear of the USSR. Hungary 
was officially 
neutral. but in reality the tentacles of the Third Reich were gaining inc
reasing control 
of the state. The acquisition of southern Transylvania, the portion lost
 at Trianon to 
Romania. was still the prin1e aim of Budapest's foreign policy. Budape
st believed that 
dose association with Hitler could achieve this, and indeed Hungary re
covered 
24 SugaL pp. 308- 13. 
25 Ibid .. p. 314. 
:
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northern Transylvania through the 1940 Second Vienna Award arbitrated by Italy and 
Gennany. 30 However, Hitler had his own agenda, namely the control of the Balkans. 
Hitler was able to use interstate tensions to convert the entire region into German 
satellite states. 
Hitler's attack upon the Soviet Union in June 194lprompted Hungary's entry 
into the war. Troops were sent to the front at first, but were soon withdrawn when the 
expected "Blitzkrieg" victory turned into a blood bath. This action prompted the Nazis 
to seek greater influence within Hungary by infiltrating its politics. This move created 
turmoil but failed to yield the results Hitler expected. More troops were sent into the 
conflict and were summarily annihilated around Voronezh while trying to support the 
Gennans at Stalingrad in January 1943. Hungary went from being a firm supporter of 
Hitler to an unwilling satellite. Miklos Kallay. the premier in 1943, with Horthy 's 
approval removed the troops from combat roles and even defied an October 1942 
Gennan decree calling for the deportation of Hungary's Jev..·s. Ka1la:r went so far as to 
order a fair settlement of Hungary's minority problems irrespective of Magyar 
treatment abroad, but unfortunately his actions were ignored by· local authorities. 
The National Socialist Party Union, Hitler's political puppet within Hungary. 
answered Kallay's audacity by attempting to bring dov.•n the government. In March 
1944 Horthy was forced to surrender effective control over the country to Hitler, or 
face invasion by all of the surrounding nations whose ancient animosities would wreak 
havoc upon his nation. Horthy remained as regent and continued to resist German 
measures. although the atrocities reached their zenith over the ensuing months. 'When a 
second front was opened against the remaining Axis powers. Horthy boldly sought a 
separate peace with Russia. He was too late. for Romania had already given Stalin a 
regional ally by switching sides and declaring war on Germany only days before. 
August 1944 marked the arrival of Soviet and Romanian troops on Hungary's border. 
A t1urry of activity that included Horthy's removal and deportation to Germany, the 
futile resistance to the siege of Budapest by his extreme fascist successors and an orgy 
of violence preceded the final peace and Soviet occupation in April 1945. The cost of 
the \\'ar for Hungary was terrible. with nearly one half million military casualties 
alone.-'1 
30Pounds. p. 475. 
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Socialist ''democracy" under the shadow of Joseph Stalin followed the 
war, and 
Hungary became a full member of the Soviet camp by turning commun
ist in 1947. The 
post war nation was characterized by a strict, agrarian-based class struc
ture. Virtually 
no industrial development had occurred since 1918. The communist par
ty responded by 
remodeling society on the Soviet system. This transformation lasted fro
m June 1948 to 
August 1949, ending with the adoption of the Constitution of the Hung
arian People's 
Republic. The process included the collectivization of farming, the exp
ansion of state 
schooling and welfare institutions, the removal of all "enemies of the p
eople" from 
responsible positions within the state infrastructure, and the establishm
ent of a one-
party system supplemented by trade unions and other mass organization
s. 32 
Nikita Khrushchev broke with the Stalinist idea of Sovietization by allo
wing the 
communist states in the Eastern Bloc to follow their own paths to soci
alism. He 
officially announced this shift in doctrine at the Twentieth Party Congr
ess of February 
1956. Hungarians took him at his word and began to openly criticize the
 socialist 
regime. October student demonstrations favoring social and political lib
erties were 
joined by armed factory workers and disgruntled soldiers. An open revolt ensued. 
forcing the Soviet command to consider Hungary's demand for neutral
ity on the 
Austrian model. Unfortunately for Hungary. the ·western powers were
 engaged 
elsewhere in the world (the Suez crisis) and gave little support to the revolt. On 4 
November, the revolution was ruthlessly crushed by Soviet forces. 
The first ~ior step toward ending authoritarian socialism in Hungary came
 in 
January 1989. when the rights of assembly and free association were gr
anted. 
Ironically, it was the people in charge. the Hungarian Socialist Worker
s' Party 
(HS\\lP), who were willing to relinquish control in order to foster change. The party 
went much further in admitting its error in labeling the 1 956 uprising a 
"counterrevolution" when in fact it was a popular uprising against tyra
nny. In 
September 1989 the government made an unprecedented decision in all
owing thousands 
of East German tourists to enter West Germany. By playing a pivotal r
ole in German 
unification. the Hungarians hoped to gain German assistance in their po
st-communist 
affairs. Hungary's move had the added benetlt of enhancing its image 
in the 'West. The 
Hungarian communist party's move led to the downfall of East Germa
ny's government. 
but it was not enough to repair its own image. Due to intra-party politi
cs, the HSWP 
3
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members were asked to re-enroll in the party. Only four percent of the members re-
joined in what was tantamount to an extraordinary vote of no confidence.33 
The citizens of Hungary had dreamed about the collapse of communism and 
independence from Soviet control for decades. The end was expected to be quite 
exciting, but their predictions were wrong. "On 23 October 1989, a number of fat, 
middle-aged men with dead eyes pressed buttons saying 'Yes,' thereby voting 
themselves out of political existence." 34 Today' s evidence suggests that the politicians 
acted as they did in exchange for money from \Vest Germany, which was desperately 
needed to help offset Budapest's huge debt. In any case. elections were held on the 
thirty-third anniversary of the 1956 revolution and today' s Hungarian Republic was 
born.3s 
..., 
..... Hungarian Culture and Society 
Hungarian society differs dramatically from its European counterparts. both 
East and \Vest. Hungary acted as a bulwark against the Moslems for centuries tmtil 
their defeat at Mohacs in 1526. Therefore. unlike the East. they were exposed to 
influences such as the Renaissance and Reformation. Yet they were tmtouched by the 
economic revolution of the seventeenth century. In the !v1iddle Ages power was the 
result of in11erited positions in society. and wealth derived from power. The 
accumulation of capital through mining. banking. and money-lending (formerly 
forbidden by the Churchl resulted in a ne\\' attitude toward investment. In \\'estern 
Europe. a rising middle class understood that money in itself equated to pmver and 
therefore large numbers of people sought personal wealth. The Ottoman Empire 
effectively shielded its European populace from these economic innovations. As a 
result. the nobility in Htmgary did not have to contend with this rising bourgeoisie (or 
middle class). and \:Vas therefore more finnly entrenched than its 'Western counterpart. 
\\7ithout a bourgeoisie to politically challenge the nobility. the landed gentry ruled the 
nation. Tv.·entieth century communism finally altered this social structure. but remnants 
of it still exist within modem Hungary. 
33 Charles Gati. The Bloc That Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition. (Bloomington. I~: 
Indiana University Press. 1990). pp. 39-43. 170-75. 






The peasantry accounted for four-fifths of Hungarian society in the eighteenth 
century.36 The peasants were under the institution of serfdom until their official 
emancipation in 1848, which was finally realized in 1853,37 Serfs were subject to the 
authority of their landlords and had no political or civil rights yet they were taxed and 
subject to military service. The Enlightenment failed to reach the peasant class. These 
people continued to operate based upon a "deeply internalized set of values derived 
from centuries of tradition and contemporary structural constraints. "
38 The peasant 
world was extremely insular, generating a conditioned mistrust of outsiders. Their 
limited political ideas were based mainly upon religious precepts. World War I 
significantly affected peasant politics because it revealed to these people the importance 
of agricultural production to the state. Hence this class brought with it some basic 
characteristics when it entered the political arena~ a self-confident quest for a greater 
standard of living reinforced by the mistrust of outsiders and a religious outlook.
3Y 
The other legal class of the eighteenth century. the nobility, included 
ecclesiastical as well as lay aristocrats. This class was only composed of about 200 
families which accounted for four to five percent of the population. 
40 The different 
levels of nobility lived at greatly differing levels of wealth and social position, although 
in theory they were all equal. The main ambition of this ruling class was originally to 
perpetuate its feudal privileges and safeguard its ancient traditions. However. the 
lower nobilit)· became increasingly aware of the equalizing power of money. and thus 
fostered an interest in modernization. better marketing and knowledge of the outside 
world in general. The chasm bet\veen the higher and lower nobility became more acute. 
but neitl1er side became engines of reform. 41 
Those of the 10\ver nobility who wanted social change (and a corresponding 
elevation in their own social status) and displayed other traditionally bourgeois attitudes 
tended to shy away from capitalism and its associated risks for fear of losing the little 
social status they held. and instead turned to the intellectual class as a n1eans to bring 
about change. Authoritarian rule further hampered the development of a true 
Y'Domokos Kos:liy. Culture and So~--ietv in Eighteenth CenturY Hungary. trans. Zsuzsa Beres. !Budapest: 
Corvina. 1987 l. p. 22. 
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entrepreneurial class. Since those with capital (the local nobility) refused to gamble on 
economic endeavors, risk-takers had to be imported. The Jews from Ukraine became 
the capitalists of Eastern Europe. Given the peasant propensity for mistrusting outsiders 
and the nobility's fear of monetary equality, it is little surprise that these Jews were not 
accepted and their values remained alien. This alienness was later applied to all 
entrepreneurs, whether Jewish or not, even in HlUlgary, where the Jews were relatively 
assimilated by language, culture and custom. The result is that "this state of affairs 
contributed materially to a deep-rooted, persistent hostility to entrepreneurial values of 
risk-taking, the market, competition, democracy [and] change. The structural weakness 
of the East European bourgeoisie contributed significantly to a corresponding weakness 
in the conceptions of modernity, attitudes to change and the institutions that would 
mediate between society and state." 4=' 
The intelligentsia developed within HlUlgary as a small yet important social 
segment. As said before, a large portion of this group came from the lower nobilit)' 
who wanted modernization, or \Vho were noble by birth but not by aft1uence. The total 
number (without family members) was 15,000- 20.000. 43 The clergy was responsible 
for educating and indeed employing most intellectuals. However, the enlightened 
nobility replaced the clergy's filllction by the mid-eighteenth century, and a cadre of 
professionals capable of manning the various scientific and bureaucratic fields was 
established by 1900. The political role of the intelligentsia is characterized as 
oppositional or revolutionary. Since this class \\'as dependent upon the state for its 
livelihood, and the state in turn feared its economic potential and challenge to its 
power, a compromise was made. The intelligentsia was given a secondary position 
beneath the nobility in the hierarchy of power. 'The intellectual minority, frustrated 
and resentful in its sense of failure. \\'ent on to fonn the ideologies of left and right 
extremes which were in this sense and this sense only. llllited by a vision of total, 
radical change. In this respect the radical minority could contribute to establishing the 
limits of debate and, to some extent. setting the agenda for the remainder of the 
intellectual con1lllilllity. "~ 4 
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Religious preference constitutes another social cleavage within Hungary. The 
Catholic Church was the dominant religion for centuries owing to Saint Stephen. The 
Church was a pedestal upon which Habsburg power rested: and so the Catholics. 
relying on Habsburg power, did everything possible to defeat the rise of Protestantism. 
Their efforts were fruitless, and today the diversity of religion within Hungary is a 
testament to this fact. The lands incorporated by the Hungarian kingdom included 
worshipers of the Orthodox and Uniate churches of the various nationalities. However, 
since the treaty of Trianon in 1920. only the majority Protestants (Calvinist or 
Lutheran) and Catholics remain in any number. 
Hungary had developed no appreciable \Vorking class by the close of World \Var 
II. The industry that did exist was based on "low technology" such as food processing 
or construction. When rapid industrialization occurred under communism. a newly 
recruited proletariat from the peasantry dwarfed and incorporated the tiny pre-war 
industrial \Vork force. The advent of communism drastically altered the shape of society 
in other ways as well. The HS\VP officially recognized three "friendly" classes: the 
workers, the peasants, and the intelligentsia - all cooperating in the process of socialist 
production. Officials sought to suppress the traditional Hungarian culture during the 
Stalinization process in the early 1950s and again after the 1956 insurrection. The pre-
war intellectuals \Vere either deprived of their positions or phased out with age. so that 
a new intelligentsia (comprised of graduates from the communist educational system 
who now occupy positions in the govermnent and service sector) formulated its identity 
in the sociopolitical influences of the post-war world. This class is rising. constituting 
t\J.'enty-eight percent of the wage earners in 1981. representing a 25.8 percent increase 
in one decade. 45 
On the other hand, nearly all Hungarians remained in touch with some aspects 
of tl1eir traditional culture under communism. mainly through the village. There are 
only seven cities within Hungary that have a population over 100,000 and only 
Budapest (2.540,000) tops Miskolc at 211.645. "6 Thus. the great majority of people 
live in small towns and hanllets. In 1985. only 19.5 percent of the population lived in 
Budapest, 43.6 percent lived in villages and 36.9 pen.--ent in small townsY A 1986 
45Toma, p. 226. 
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study by Hans-Georg Heinrich revealed that all occupational groups are affected by this 
trend. Forty-six percent of the Blue-collar workers lived in villages as well as 83.5 
percent of the collective peasantry, 25.8 percent of the white collar workers, and 60.3 
percent of the small commodity producers lived there as well. 48 
However, it would be misleading to imply that the village life remained 
unchanged under socialism. The social structure can no longer be differentiated in 
terms of a peasant and working class. Families are often intermixed, with one spouse 
working in industry while another farms, and the economic reforms in the late 1960s 
created great stratification within the classes themselves. "Thus, the background and 
experiences of the younger generations in villages are different, and consequently the:y' 
have ambitions and aspirations other than those of older generations. "49 
3. Hungarian Strategic Culture 
Many specific fmdings about Hungarian strategic culture can be gleaned from 
the preceding survey of that nation's history and society. The following is a list and 
short discussion of the relevant fmdings. Once again, these factors are not necessarily 
the driving forces behind specific Hungarian policies. They may, however. help to 
explain Budapest's behavior and enable us to better assess future prospects. 
a. Belief that they are a \\Testern European nation. 
The Hungarians firmly believe that the forty-four years during which 
they were associated \Vith the Eastern European nations while a member of the Soviet 
Bloc V/as a historical discontinuity. Their early acceptance of Roman Catholicism, their 
position as a defensive barrier against the ~1ongol and Turkish (at least for a while) 
incursions. their pursuit of enlightened reforms after the Napoleonic era (reflected in 
the 1848 revolution) V.'hile part of the Austrian Empire. and the Germanic influence 
from the Empire are all considered evidence of Hungary's \\7estem orientation. 
This theory disregards contrary facts such as the late date at which feudal 
institutions such as serfdom were abolished. the impact of the Ottomans, and the lack 
of industrialization and liberalism until the twentieth century. However, in cultural 
study it is perceptions that count. and the Hungarians are convinced that they belong in 
4 ~Hana-Gorg Heinrich. Hungan' (London: Frances Pinter. 19861. p. 106. as reprinted in Toma, p. 228. 
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the West and should be promptly admitted to institutions such as NATO and the 
European Union. 
b. Calvinist religion a distinguishing factor. 
Calvinism dominates politics, despite its being the religion practiced by 
only one third of the population. 5° Calvinism came to embody certain distinctive ideas 
of Protestant faith, including the concept of predestination. The Calvinist history of 
challenging authority and formerly accepted ideas promotes skepticism in political 
thought. The Hungarian public's reaction to government edicts is cautious, analytical, 
and skeptical. That is. government programs are critically evaluated rather than blindly 
accepted out of deference to their official source. Hungarian Protestantism encourages 
intellectual opposition and debate within the Magyar society. Therefore. the ability to 
shape public opinion becomes an important factor for Budapest when dealing V.'ith 
issues deemed vital to the average citizen. such as Transylvania and Magyar rights 
abroad. The importance of this factor is made clearer by contrasting it with the 
Romanian Orthodox faith's traditional subservience to authorit)·. and the lack of public 
outcry over perceived it~ justice ! at least by the majority of the citizens). 
c. Hungary is surrounded by antagonistic states and nations. 
Hungary has been at odds \\'ith its neighbors since the middle ages. This 
is really a result of its own attempts to su~jugate the other nations within the region. 
from Sai.t1t Stephen's kingdom until \:Vorld War II. Particular animosities resulted from 
~·1agyar-dominated governance and Mag,yarization policies during the Dual Monarchy. 
The experiences after \\'orld \\7ar I. especially Trianon, and during \Vorld \Var II 
validated this sentin1ent. Hungary must carefully weigh any and all diplomatic actions it 
takes as a result. Every state must take into account possible counter-reactions of the 
international community when deciding upon a course of action, but Hungary is 
surrounded by states which continue to hold a grudge against the Magyars. This forces 
Hungary to be extremely sensitive to regional concerns. This effectively limits 
Budapest's choices in foreign affairs. Hungary's quest for physical security is also 
affected by regional attitudes. The prospects for help or intervention from its neighbors 
in a crisis are questionable. so the state is placed in a position whereby it must rely 
5
''Stone. p. 63. 
upon its own strength, or seek support from friends outside Southeastern Europe. 
NATO, the European Union and other Western institutions are a logical source of allies 
since the Magyars consider themselves a historical Western European ''island" in the 
East. 
d. Pessimistic attitude toward the intentions and capabilities of 
government. 
Hungarian history reveals a thousand years of turmoil. with the state 
usually on the receiving end of disaster. There are very few positive events for the 
nation to take pride in. Hungary has a short history of independence with a mixed track 
record at best. It is a nation that has never won an enduring victory in war. There is 
little substance to the pomp and ceremony of statehood, for Hungary has never been a 
great power in its own right. The Dual :Monarchy. of which Hungary was tl1eoretically 
an equal partner, was the feeblest of the great powers. Hungarian citizens are patriotic. 
For example, a survey in 1982 sho\\'ed that 92.4 percent of Hungarians reported a 
"deep emotion when the anthem was played" 51 (although the survey was taken during 
communism, perhaps artificially int1ating the resultsl. Yet they expect very little in 
return from their government. 5:C Even the best intended policies of the central 
government have at times been sabotaged by local authorities. Finally. one of the 
primary legacies of communism was the destruction of traditional institutions. already 
distrusted in Hungary, and the replacement of these institutions with new ones of 
foreign (Russian) design. Communism's collapse cast a negative shadow upon all of the 
achievements during the communist period. including personal careers. This effectively 
discredited most institutions. v.·hich are still operated by professional bureaucrats .53 
This attitude leads to government instability. Hungary's ruling elite must 
be concerned about maintaining popular support in order to remain in power (like all 
democratically elected officials), as shown in the June 1994 election defeat of the 
conservatives at the hands of the socialists (mostly former communists). Political 
leaders can not deviate too far from popular preferences without losing support. 
Attempts at changing public opinion are often rejected out of hand by the public. This 
discourages the government from embarking upon bold new initiatives to solve 
51 Toma. p. 237. 
52Stone. p. 58. 
53Schi.1pflin. p. 274- 75. 
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Hungary's current dilemmas. The politicians must overcome their inglorious past and 
devote more energy to attaining respect and legitimacy rather than tackling the issues at 
hand. Finally, the distrust of Budapest's intentions can at times manifest itself in the 
refusal of citizens to obey official orders. The central government is therefore not in 
total control of the nation's future. The ability to subvert or disregard laws enacted by 
Budapest at the local level of government means that unpopular policies, no matter how 
enlightened, may not be implemented at all. A government whose demands are not 
adhered to by its electorate is unlikely to govern for long. 
e. Belief that they are generally non-discriminatory. 
The cosmopolitan nature of Hungary vanished after Trianon and the 
state becan1e one of the most homogenous nations of Eastern Europe (only 10% of the 
nation was non-Magyar) .54 Oppression and Mag_yarization of the Hungarian minorities 
V.'as the reality of the Hungarian Kingdom. However, time has given the nation over si.'l: 
decades to forget its past mistakes. Today. the people point to their "protection" of the 
Jews during the Nazi Holocaust. and the Hungarian parliament's recent passing of a 
comprehensive law granting minorities collective rights55 as proof of their 
benevolence. This disregards the resurfacing of anti-Semitic feelings within Hungary 
that either alwa:ys was an underlying problem. or is a result of the social and economic 
upheaval with the corresponding urge to exonerate the state's responsibility through a 
"scapegoat" group.s6 
Hungarian officials tend to forget their nation's own historical 
transgressions \\'hen dealing with Romania. and see the minority rights issue in black 
and white terms with Bucharest always playing the part of the villain. Romania. on the 
other hand. has not forgotten hm\' the r..-tag_yars treated ethnic Romanians and other 
minorities in Hungary when they fell under Budapests' s rule. Bucharest therefore 
interprets Hungary's championing of minority rights as political posturing rather than a 
fundamental cultural value. Each of the two governments continues to misunderstand 
the motivations behind its counterpart's actions in ethnic dealings as a result. This 
54Bennett Kovrig. "Hungarian Minorities in East-Central Europe." Ocx."asional Paper Series of the Atlantic 
Council of the United States. March 1994. p. 3. 
55 Edith Oltay, "Hungary Passes Law on Minority Rights." RFE RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 44, 5 
Nov 93. p. 58. 
56!\·hchael Shafir. "Anti-Semitism Without Jews in Romania." RFE RL Report on Eastern Europe. Vol. 
2. No. 26. 28 June 1991. p. 29. 
makes it extremely difficult to fmd areas of mutual agreement from which to improve 
current relations. 
f. Tradition of foreign powers influencing domestic politics. 
Hungarian policy and lifestyle were dominated by the Germanic-minded 
Holy Roman Emperors and their Habsburg successors for centuries. The Dual 
Monarchy gave Budapest a say in local affairs by means of a veto pO\'ver, but Vienna 
still set the domestic agenda. Independence fmally made Hungary totally responsible 
for its own actions. However, the state soon allied with the Axis powers and Hungary 
became a veritable puppet of the Third Reich. Soviet domination was the ultimate 
expression of foreign influence. The end of the Soviet empire has left Hungary without 
allies for the first time. Already it has sought to join the European Union and other 
associations. Perhaps close ties \t.·ith democratic regimes will positively influence future 
state decisions. 
g. Belief in a strong bond between Magyars at home and 
abroad. 
The number of tv1agyar and Szekely people residing outside Hungary 
v.•ill reach 3,430.000 by the year 2000.57 "Some values are so vital for national security 
and survival that they are in fact national interests requiring protection and defense. "58 
At least some segments of the Hungarian population would argue that the livelihood of 
:rvlagyars abroad is of national interest. including citizens in policy making positions. 
Lajos Fur. then Hungarian Minister of Defense. in 1992 regarded the safeguarding of 
Magyars abroad as an "inseparable facet" of national security .s:;. l\·1uch of this sentiment 
derives from the perceived humiliation suffered at Trianon and the yearning to re-
acquire lost greatness in the form of territory. However. perceived kinship is also 
important. The plight of the Magyars abroad will remain important to Hungary's 
national interest as long as this perception of kinship endures and the state remains 
democratic. 
57 Divid Zolt:'in. "Statistics: The Hungarians and Their :Seighbon;, 1851- 2000," in The Hungarians: A 
Divided Nation. ed. Stephen Bon;ody. (~ew Haven: Yale Center For International and Area Studies, 
1988). p. 345. 
58Adda B. Bozeman. 'T .S. Foreign Polll.;.· and the Prospe..-ts for Democracy, National Security and 
World Peace," in Comparative StrategY. Vol. 5. No.3. 1985, p. 223. 
59:1\·ih:'hael Shafir. "Transylvania Shadows. Transylvania Lights." RFE· RL Research Rt!Jort. Vol. 1. :So. 
26. 26 June 1992. p. 29. 
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h. The importance of the village. 
The exact cultural impact the village has upon society is hard to 
determine after Sovietization. Certainly some of the traditional ways of thinking were 
retained under communism, especially given the widespread disillusionment that 
became apparent towards the end of HS\VP rule. However, other traditional ideas have 
given way. Social mobility, unheard of in the old agrarian economy, is no\1/ possible by 
commuting to work while maintaining residence in the village. The secondary econom)' 
that developed in the late communist period suggests a mellowing of animosity toward 
entrepreneurship. 60 and the younger generation advocates change instead of resisting it. 
Yet the village remains _at the very least. a link with history and Hungary's cultural 
roots. 
Some of these cultural traits are detrimental to the conduct of successful 
international relations. The age-old fear of village outsiders, represented by the central 
government and foreign nations in modern times, makes it difficult to change popular 
attitudes built up over time. Hungary openly sought to regain Transylvania and other 
past glories for decades. and Romania has been considered a regional adversary for 
centuries. These ideas have become ingrained in the Hungarian psyche. The 
government can not erase these attitudes over night. if at all. A population that is wary 
of its own leadership will be apt to retain traditional ways of thinking rather than to 
embrace new ones. especially after t.mdergoing a de-sovietization process so recently. 
B. ROMANIA 
1. An Overview of Romania's History 
From the first days of nation-building, "Romanian identity \Vas linked \1:ith 
history. "61 As a result, history and politics have become so intertwined over time that 
they are virtually inseparable today. Even the origins of Romania evoke heated debate. 
There are three schools of thought. The "Latinist" camp asserts that modern Romanians 
are the descendants of the Roman Emperor Trajan's Dacian legions and colonists. The 
"Dacianists" believe they are the direct descendants of the original Dacian inhabitants 
v.'ho adopted some of the Roman civilization. including Latin. but who lack Roman 
60Ibid. 
61 Katherine Ven:lery. National ldeolog)· Under Socialism: ldentitv and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's 
Romania. (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1991 l. p. 31. 
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bloodlines. The most widely accepted view is a combination of the two, in which 
Romanians are a mingling of the two cultures. 62 Regardless, the first Romanian states, 
Wallachia and Moldavia, were established by the vlachs (Romanians) around 1300 after 
several centuries during which their whereabouts are unknown. 63 Transylvania, which 
modern Romanians consider their third historic province, was by that time part of the 
Kingdom of Hungary. 64 The voevods (princes) of the time were primarily concerned 
with avoiding Magyar rule and not Romanian unification as some revisionists have 
attempted to claim. By the fifteenth century self preservation through the maintenance 
of the existing social order was the only concern of the region, but Turkish suzerainty 
could not be avoided. 155 
The Ottoman Turks gained control of Moldavia and Wallachia during the 
fourteenth century. Romanians thus occupied the extreme Northwest of the Ottoman 
Empire, a position that proved to be very advantageous. The great distance from 
Anatolia spared the Romanians from excessive central control. The Turks relied upon 
local lords (hospodars)of their choosing. usually Phanariote Greeks or local 
aristocracy, to enforce order instead of building villages and military outposts. The 
Romanian principalities were maintained by the Empire to help feed Constantinople. 66 
During this period very fev.·· ethnic minorities lived in Moldavia and ~'allachia. 
These people were treated tolerantly. even though they had no political rights as 
foreigners.67 However, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries \Vitnessed the influx of 
Romanies (Gypsies) in Eastem Europe from India. f\1ost settled on the outskirts of 
established villages. The men found work as fannhands, smiths, and musicians while 
the women acted as servants.68 Meamvhile, the conditions of the Romanian peasant 
were worsening. Caught in constant international turmoil between the great states, the 
rulers of ~'allachia and Moldavia had made decisions over time reducing the peasants 
62Ibid. 
63Stephen Fischer-Gahti. T\ventieth Centuu· Rumania, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 
10. 
64:Michael Shafir. Romania; Politics. Economics and SocietY. !Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Inc .. 1985 l. p. 1. 
65 Fische:r-Gahti. Twentieth Centu:rv Romania. p. 10- 11. 
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67 i\1atei Cazacu. National Center for Scientific Research in Paris. as :reported in "Roundtable: 
Transylvania's Past and Future," ed. Michael Shafirand Alfred A. Reisch, RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol. 2, No. 24. 11 June 1993. p. 28. 
68Sha:ron Fisher, "Romanies in SloYakia." RFEiRL Research Report. Vol. 2. ~o. 42. 22 Oct. 1993. p. 
54. 
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to serfdom. Modern "nationalists" look to this period as the birth of "Greater 
Romania." Military campaigns against "foreign" enemies occurred, but they were not 
carried out in hopes of liberating all Romanians. Rather, they were fought out of 
necessity against the Russians, Ottomans, Greeks, Hungarians and other states who 
wanted to dominate the region. 
Michael the Brave, a sixteenth century 'Wallachian voevod, is seen by many as 
the first nationalist hero. He temporarily united the three traditional territories in a war 
against the Turks and their vassals, the Mag:var princes of Hungary. It appears that 
Michael was fighting for personal power. and actually worsened the condition of 
Romanians, including legalizing serfdom. Meanwhile, the masses apparently fought to 
protect their few remaining legal rights and possessions, not for any idealistic cause.r::9 
Transylvania took a different historical path. Romanians in Transylvania. 
contrary to Romanian nationalist theories. did not yearn to join the other states in a 
Greater Romania. These people were dissatisfied with their inferior position to their 
ivlagyar and German lords, but realized that life under the voevods \\'ould be worse. 1 (
1 
"Until tl1e 18th Century, there was no [etlmic] problem of Transylvania and of the 
situation of Romanians there." 71 Furthennore. these Romanians received ·western 
influences as a result of their association with the Hungarian and Habsburg empires. 
including the Reformation. Transylvanian Romanians were isolated from the other 
state's historical experience and \\'ere indifferent to tl1eir distant brethren's problems. 
Therefore, their e111erging concerns in tl1e late eighteenth century were understandably 
unique.7=' 
From tl1e late eighteenth century until the end of the nineteenth Century. 
Transylvanian Romanians began demanding equality with the other two ethnic powers. 
the Germans and rvlag:vars. Tl1ese 3 million people began to consider themselves a 
distinct community rather than simply· members of the cosmopolitan empire.l-3 By tl1e 
nineteenth l"'entury. intellectuals from all three provinces cultivated nationalist 
sentiment. These 111en were strongly influenced by tl1e French Enlighte1111lent. Their 
realization tl1at Romania. like Franl"'e. had been part of the Roman Empire provided a 
foundation from which nationalism grew. It was at this tinle that the Daco-Romanian 
69 Fische:r-Gahti. Tv.:entieth Centun· Romania. pp. 11 - 12. 
70Ibid .. p. 13. 
71 Cazacu. "Roundtable: .. ," p. 30. 
7='Fischer-Gahti, Twentieth Centur; Rumania. pp. 14- 15. 
73 GustaY l\1olnar. of the Central European Institute in Budapest. "Roundtable: .. ," pp. 27 - 28. 
28 
theory of national origins was born. The theory implied Slav and Magyar barbarism, 
which dovetailed well with the Romanians' impulse to denigrate their traditional 
enemies. The rediscovery of their Latin origins coincided with the formation of the first 
true Romanian state. 
During the eighteenth century Russian influence in the Balkans slowly replaced 
that of Turkey. The Treaty ofKuchuk Kainarji in 1774 made the Tsar the official 
protector of Christians within the Ottoman Empire. Romania became an important 
object of Russian foreign policy designs because it represented a foothold near the 
Turkish Straits. By the nineteenth century, Romania was still legally ruled by the 
Turkish Sultan, but in reality the Tsar held effective control. In 1821, the hospodors 
ceased being Greeks from the Phanar quarter of Constantinople and henceforth were 
native Romanians. In 1859 Moldavia and \Vallachia were joined, creating the United 
Principalities. This resulted from a Crimean 'War compromise reached between Great 
Britain. France, and Russia concerning the Balkan question. The United Principalities 
were not officially a single state. Each maintained its o\·vn prince and parliament. but a 
commission was created to decide matters of joint interest. However, the Romanians 
outfoxed the Great Powers. who wanted tv.·o separate territories for geo-political 
reasons. by electing Alexander Cuza head of both principalities. On 23 December 
1861. Prince Cuza proclaimed the union of the two. and Romania was established. 
Cuza's reign was short lived. In 1866. Cuza's crown was offered to Prince Charles. a 
member of the Prussian Hohenzollern family. at the forceful urging of Otto von 
Bismark. Charles. known as Carol in Romania. ruled the nation until his death in 
1914.74 
Transylvania's 3~6 year old parliament was abolished by the liberal H1mgarian 
state in 1867. creating a 1mitary province with one oftl.ciallanguage and university in 
its wake. nan1ely Hungarian. This "winner take all" attitude toward democracy fostered 
ethnic tension. 75 A new Russo-Turkish \Var occurred in 1877 and added to the 
fledgling state's troubles. The Romanians greatly contributed to the war effort by 
allowing Russian troops upon their territory. The Russians responded to this help by 
74 Pounds. pp. 530- 32. 
75Molnar. "Roundtable: ... " 
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annexing the legally and ethnically Romanian territories of southern Bessarabia. This 
loss became the driving force for Romania's entrance into World War 1.76 
Early Romanian nationalism was characterized by a physical struggle against the 
Turks and an intellectual one against the dominance of Slavonic and then Greek arts. 
The movement began in Transylvania and spread south, focusing on the development of 
Romanian language and literature to offset foreign influences. 77 In all three Romanian 
regions, the transformation was marked by the fall of the nobility in the face of a 
growing central power. The decline of agriculture and corresponding rise in 
manufacturing also removed the nobility's traditional power base, forcing them to 
assimilate with the rising bourgeoisie and bureaucratic class which in turn led the 
national movement. 78 
The 'Old Kingdom' before 1918 had practically no minorities. Only the Jewish 
population was discriminated against, since Christianity was required for citizenship. 79 
In 1913, Romania acquired southern Dobruja from Bulgaria in the Second Balkan \Var. 
The Russian Revolution gave Romanians in Bessarabia a chance to rejoin their ethnic 
brothers, which they did, and Ronrinia Mare IGreater Romania) was achieved after the 
First World War.so 
The first diplomatic efforts of the \Vorld War I belligerents were aimed at 
persuading Italy and lesser states, notably Romania. to take part in the conflict. 
Romania resisted these attempts and declared its neutrality on 4 August 1914, just a 
few days before hostilities began. Romania had been an ally of Austria-Hungary and 
Germany since 1883. but the former state's refusal to address repeated complaints 
about the conditions of Romanians residing in Transylvania undermined the treaty. 
Meanwhile, the Russians and their allies saw a great advantage in Romania's 
participation. They envisioned a potential revolt of Romanians within Hungary, and the 
tying down of several Austro-Hungarian divisions along that axis at a minimum. 
Finally. French financial aid. Russian pressure. and most importantly, a secret promise 
76!\.fichael Shafir. Romania: Politics. Economics and S01.---iet<.:. !Boulder. Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
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to take Transylvania from Hungary overrode Carol's family ties; and Romania entered 
the war. 81 Romanian troops attacked in August 1916 and were subsequently overrun by 
forces from Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, which occupied Bucharest in 
December. The Treaty of Bucharest, signed in May 1918, forced Romania to cede all 
territory that provided a tactical advantage to the defense of the country. However, 
Romania's enemies were forced to surrender within a year. 82 
The provinces of Transylvania. Banat and Bukovina became sovereign 
Romanian territory as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, which was discussed earlier. 
This effectively doubled the size of Romania overnight. One side effect of this doubling 
in geographic size was a new multi-cultural population. 28.5 percent of the citizens 
were now non-Romanian "at the very time when the Romanian nation-state was 
creating its own national identity and what it meant to be Romanian." 83 
In 1919 Romania signed a treaty in Saint-Germain guaranteeing the rights and 
citizenship of all the minorities acquired in the former Austro- Hungarian lands. 84 
Despite these assurances, the government began to deflect public animosity over 
worsening economic conditions toward the minorities in an effort to distance 
themselves from responsibility. Traditional enemies. like Hungary and Russia, as well 
as their corresponding ethnic groups in Romania, were blamed for all of Romania's 
post-war problems. Romanian patriotism. already founded upon hatred for neighboring 
states which had sought to subdue Romanian nationalism in the pasL came to be 
associated with ethnic discrimination as a result. This set a precedent that has continued 
to the present, and has become such a central facet of the Romanian psyche that it may 
be impossible to reverse. 
The inter-war years were not particularly stable either. "Romania's problems in 
the immediate post-war years may be ascribed ultimately to the unwillingness of the 
Bucharest politicians to proYide adequate formulae for national and international 
reconciliation. "85 The events leading to and during the Second \Vorld War brought 
anotl1er round of change to the infant government. Corneliu Zelea Codreanu founded a 
Romanian fascist movement called the Legion of Archangel Saint Michael in 1927. 
81 James Jolt The Origins of the First V:orld V.::u. Socond Edition. (Kew York: Longman. 1992). pp. 35. 
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Renamed the Iron Guard in 1930, this movement was not an imitation of German or 
Italian models but rather a home-grown philosophy based on an "idealized past, 
sanctified by the bond of 'blood and soil,' as embodied by the peasantry and founded in 
religion. "86 This extreme movement gained widespread support in the face of a series 
of national embarrassments, namely the dismantling of the Guard's beloved Greater 
Romania. 
Most of the territories gained at Vienna after World War I were lost once again 
due to German and Soviet designs. In September 1940 the National-Legionary State 
was established under Marshal Antonescu with the help of Horia Sima, the Iron 
Guard's second leader. A failed coup in January 1941 by Sima resulted in the Guard's 
expulsion from Romania. 87 but its existence continued as an SS puppet in Germany 
until the war's end. Antonescu's government was typically violent, marked by many 
pogroms and the ultimate exile of 300.000 Jews to Transdniestria (the barren lands 
between the Dniester and Bug rivers), where most perished. 88 Antonescu's brand of 
nationalism continued to foster the notion of Romanians being a besieged nation that 
must be ever v:ary of the "foreigner's" true intentions. Antonescu' s rule ended on 
August 23, 1944. with the return of King ivlichael to power. after he defeated his 
father, Carol II, in a palace coup. Romania summarily switched sides in the war, but 
the anti-minority attitudes. particularly against the Jews. continued.89 
Communism was attractive to the etlmic minorities in Romania in the early 
days. These people were drawn to the idea of equality in a government that disregarded 
nationalit)' in favor of the socialist man. As a result. five of the first six Party 
Secretaries were non-Romanians. The Romanian Communist Party (RCP) would never 
have gained power without Soviet intervention. since the public at large rejected its 
minority makeup. These facts are often cited by today' s Romanian nationalists as proof 
that tl1e communist system was an alien system forced upon them by tl1e ethnic 
minorities with the help of the Soviets. Minorities continued to be a large faction in the 
RCP tmtil the rnid-1950s. \\'hen Gheorghiu-Dej 's pro-ethnic Romanian faction finally 
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took control. 90 Prime Minister Petru Groza' s administration (1945 - 52) had been 
tolerant of the minorities in the wake of the war, but 1956 saw the introduction and 
gradual increase of nationalist policies once again in response to the Hungarian 
uprising. 91 A policy of "ethnic purification" started with the deportation of thousands of 
ethnic-Germans and the continued persecution of the other peoples, including a general 
policy of intimidation and police terror. 92 Dej 's Stalinist tactics continued until his 
death in March 1965, nearly a decade after Stalinism had been denounced by the 
USSR. 
Nicolae Ceausescu then took the reins of leadership. The 'Ceausescu Era' saw 
the intensification of "appeals to chauvinistic sentiment to gain popular support in the 
face of deteriorating economic conditions. [He] propounded the myth of Romanian 
cultural superiority in an effort to create national cohesion. "93 Romania was the only 
communist country in which National Communism was not just a phase, but the main 
legitimizing factor of the government. This demonstrates how powerful a force 
nationalism is to the Romanian people. "Romanianization" of the ethnic minorities 
began in earnest through the combining of educational, social and cultural activities as 
a way of phasing out the minority's own cultural heritage.94 
Huge parades in honor of Ceausescu and communism were a part of Romanian 
life for years. The censorship of the media and the seemingly omnipotent secret police 
(Securita te) stifled all resistance to the regime. It is estimated that one out of every 
eight Romanian citizens was associated with the Securitate.95 This is why Ceausescu 
was shocked by a spontaneous demonstration in Timisoara. Laszlo Tokes, a reverend of 
the Calvinist Reformed Church. had earlier granted an interview for Hungarian 
television in which he criticized the goYernment of Romania. This interview \vas 
rebroadcast into Romania, and so the authorities harassed and eventually decided to 
deport the reverend. It was in his defense that a crowd grew in defiance of the 
authorities on 15 December 1989, and days of rioting ensued. Five days later 
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Ceausescu appeared on Romanian television chastising Tokes' supporters. He scheduled 
a state counter-demonstration in support of the state, but this move backfired. The 
Bucharest parade members also broke into defiance of Ceausescu. Open rebellion 
followed, earning Romania the distinction of being the only East European communist 
state to collapse in violence. On 21 December Ceausescu fled, but was later captured. 
tried and shot. Ion lliescu and his political party, the Popular Front, took control of the 
nation.96 
The revolution of December 1989 heralded the end of Ceausescu and 
communism in Romania, but left the successors with some unenviable legacies. The 
tradition of nationalized politics continues as before, while the intensified mistreatment 
of minorities in the last 30 years has led to even sharper cleavages in society. The 
already romanticized (and often distorted) version of popular history was further 
muddied by the communists. who taught several generations of Romanians to fear their 
neighbors. Finally, the people were trained to believe in simplistic solutions (in iv1arxist 
dogma), that there is a single problem and a single answer. This black and white vie\\' 
of the world leads to misunderstanding and mistrust in others' intentions. Meanwhile. 
the minorities "are bound to perceive the state as having been ethnicized [in the face of 
Romanianization], whether in reality this is so or not. "97 
2. Romanian Culture and Society 
The institutions in pre-twentieth century Romanian society were similar to those 
found in Hungary. The aristocracy's power stemmed from land ownership. The lack of 
a middle class deprived the peasants of political leadership and fostered economic 
bacb:~,·ardness. Romania and Hungary were both traditional farming states whose usual 
purpose was to feed the Empires that governed them. and both states were traumatized 
by the forced social renovation under communism. However. there are differences in 
the two experiences as well. 
Romanians. unlike their Magyar cow1terparts. occupied the lowest rung in the 
social ladder for centuries. The foreign nobility considered ethnic Romanians as 
nothing more than serfs. For example, serf and n1Imn (Romanian) held the same 
meaning in the Wallach idiom. Some Romanians managed to avoid serfdom. These 
people lived in communal villages that also hampered individual autonomy and lacked 
9'~lbid .. pp. 94-106. 
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entrepreneurial incentives.98 The rapid industrialization of Romania contributed to the 
decline of the village's status. The percentage of the population employed by the 
agricultural sector dropped from 75 percent in 1950 to less than 30 percent by the 
1980s. This decline was accompanied by a 25 percent decrease in the population 
residing outside of cities.99 In addition. over half of all rural dwellers commute to the 
cities to work. 100 Nevertheless, a study devoted to the impact of modernization found 
that it failed to cancel out traditional peasant attitudes of pessimism, passivity, 
resignation to fate, and acceptance of the established order .1 01 
The intelligentsia of Romania also took a path distinct from that in Hungary. 
Conformity was even more pronounced among the intelligentsia during communism. 
One explanation for this trend was that it resulted from the large percentage of first 
generation intelligentsia, that is, members of the class whose parents were workers or 
peasants. These newcomers to the class owed their social mobility to the system. Other 
factors included the relatively low number of pre-war communist intellectuals. and 
Ceausescu's penchant for blackmail and intimidation. Ceausescu's nationalist-style 
communism also served to derail what little intellectual opposition remained in 
Romania. The intelligentsia were allowed to vent their frustrations and suppressed 
nationalist sentiment by attacking Romania's traditional foreign enemies, Hungary and 
Russia. This virtually eliminated domestic criticism, and anti-foreigner nationalism 
remains a key topic among the post-communist thinkers and politicians. 1Ci:2 
The Romanian Orthodox Church is the established faith in Romania. The 1923 
Constitution declared that it was the state's "dominant" religion. Roughly 70 percent of 
Romanian citizens are affiliated with Orthodoxy .1CJ3 Orthodoxy teaches obedience, 
submission to authorit)· and resignation to the word of God. Thus passive and 
contemplative virtues are stressed. The split of the Church in the Middle Ages had a 
tremendous impact upon states \J.'hich evolved from the Greek Orthodox faith. Westem 
ideals failed to develop, including the separation of Church and state. 104 As a result, 
tl1e Orthodox Church became a govemn1ent tool for mobilizing the people in its behalf, 
98Shafi.L Romania ... pp. 132- 33. 
99Ibid., p. 139. 
I0:1did .. p. 141. 
!C' 1Everett I\1. Rogers. Modemization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication, (New York: 
Holt. Rinehart and Winston, 1969l. p. 27 3. 
1C02Shafir. Romania ... J.1fl. 144- 50. 
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rather than the church playing the role of opposition by advocating citizen's rights or 
equality under the rule of law. 
The Romanian Communist Party (RCP ), although ostensibly atheist, recognized 
the usefulness of Orthodoxy. Patriarch Marina, and his successor Justin Moisescu, 
collaborated with the RCP by silencing priests who spoke out against the regime. The 
communists repaid the Patriarchs by forcefully encouraging Romanian Uniates, made 
up primarily of Catholic minorities living in Transylvania. to convert to Orthodoxy. 
Encouragement included the transfer of Uniate property to Orthodoxy, as well as the 
arrests, persecution. and assassination of those who refused to convert. 105 Under these 
conditions it is not surprising that the spark which signaled the regime's demise came 
from a Calvinist priest and not subservient Orthodoxy. 
The major difference between modem Romanian and Hungarian society is the 
presence or lack of minority ethnic groups. The end of Hungary's multi-cultural society 
created new mmority groups within Romania. The huge population of citizens that are 
not ethnic Romanians continues to be the most prominent feature of domestic politics. 
One of the most significant multi-ethnic regions in Europe, the province of 
Transylvania has been home to 6 million Romanians as well as 2.5 million Mag_·vars 
(Hungarians), 400,000 Germans. and an equal number of Jews, Gypsies, Ukrainians. 
Serbs, Greeks. Turks, Bulgars and others.1o0 Comparing this to the nation's total 
population of 22.7 million, of which 89.4 percent are Romanian, 7.1 percent 
Hungarian. and 7 to 8 percent Gypsy (UN estimate), it is easy to understand why the 
issue permeates Romanian politics.lCI 
Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu recently stated that the "Romanian state 
campaigns for the strict observance of the norms of international standards regarding 
the mmorities and makes every effort to secure the rights of national minorities in 
Romania." l·:Js Contrary to his words. it seems that the state has no interest in changing 
past policies. Both rightist and leftist Romanian governments have followed policies 
akin to "ethnic purification" in the past. The various regimes expelled all types of 
lOSshafir, Romania ... p. 151 -52. 
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minorities at one time or another in an effort to create a singular ethnic society .109 This 
explains why traditional inter-ethnic conflicts in Romania are not simply re-emerging 
after communism, but have never been absent. Today, the government has taken the 
form of a "Totalitarian Democracy," or the arbitrary rule of majorities who disregard 
the individual and collective rights of the minorities. 11 0 This "Totalitarian Democracy" 
is driven by the extremist groups that surfaced in 1991, which are known for their 
virulent stances. The influence of these groups on the government signals the 
continuance of ethnic woes in Romania. 
As noted earlier, the Magyars constitute the largest ethnic minority in Romania. 
These people have lived a precarious existence within the country since the Vienna 
awards. Bucharest's claims that its Magyar citizens are treated according to European 
standards of minority rights are misleading. The Magyar's rights have steadily 
deteriorated over the last four decades and have improved little since 1989. 111 The 
RCP's persecution of the Magyars began in earnest as a reaction to the Hungarian 
uprising of 1956. This social upheaval spread to the ethnic Transylvanian communities. 
leading to immediate mass arrests. imprisonment. deportations and executions. The 
uprisings were also used by Ceausescu to discredit the Hungarian community over the 
next several decades. 112 'Gulash Communism' also created problems for the Romanian 
communists. Their citizens could see that the lives of the neighboring Hungarians were 
substantially better. The Bucharest govenunent responded by systematically persecuting 
the ethnic Hungarians in Romania. appeasing the ethnic Romanian citizenry . 113 
The follov.'ing list taken from a United States govenunent investigation 
illustrates the anti-Hungarian measures taken by the Romanian government, and is by 
no means all- inclusive. 
1960 - Overall administrative reorganization of Romania provide5 the opportunity for 
genymandering the Hungarian autonomous region out of existence. Purely Hungarian areas are detached 
from it. while Romanian inhabited areas are attached to it to dilute its compact Hungarian nature. The 
name also reflects this erosion ... Mures-l\1agyar Autonomous Region. In 1968 this region is eliminated, 
and three counties are created from its territory !Mures. Harghita. and Covasna). 
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1974 - Laws open the door to the legal confiscation of all "documents, recordings. official and 
private correspondence, diaries, manifestos, posters, sketches, drawings, engravings, imprints, seals and 
like material" over 30 years o1d from the possession of religious and cuhural institutions and private 
citizens. This allowed the confiscation of historically significant items, eradicating the history of German. 
Hungarian and other nationalities in Tmnsylvania. 
1982- Inflammatory, anti-Hungarian flyers written in Romanian appear in southeastern 
Tmnsylvania. The texts, such as "Romanian Brothers! The Hungarians are traitors, they want to give 
Tmnsylvania away. Stop them! Beat them! Tear them asunder!" openly incite Romanians against 
Hungarians. 
~-A decree limiting the number of Hungarian-speaking students at the University of Cluj 
(Kolozsvar) to 5% (at an institution where Hungarians c-.Qmprise 65% l of the student body. Another docree 
specifies that all geography and history teachers must be ethnic- Romanians. 
1985 - Rolls of toilet paper from Romania recycled from Hungarian-language Bibles are publidy 
displayed in Washington DC. Evidence is presented that the toilet paper had been manufactured from 
20,000 Bibles donated by the Hungarian Reform Chul'C'h in 1975. for distribution among the ethnic 
Hungarians. At the time Romania first received Most Favored Nation status from the US .. the Romanian 
regime had pointed to the acc-eptance of the Bibles as proof of its magnanimity towards the Hungarian 
minority. 114 
The Magyar comnumity has continued to register complaints about their 
treatment up to the present day. The Hungarians bemoan the fact that the new 
Bucharest government has yet to pass laws regulating the relations between Romanians 
and ethnic minorities. The Romanian "unitary state" declared in the constitution is 
another major point of consternation. This is regarded by the Mag_yars as having 
opened the door to ethnic discrimination. A draft law on primary and university 
education proposed by Iliescu' s government will hinder the Mag_yars' s request for the 
re-establishment of at least one state-financed university with courses taught in 
Hungarian. preferably the Bolyai llniversity in Cluj. 115 The most pressing concerns of 
the ethnic Hungarians are guaranteed cultural autonomy. native language instruction at 
all levels, and the erection of bi-lingual signs in settlements where a significant share of 
the population is Mag_yar. All of these demands run counter to the central government's 
belief in individual vice collective rights of the minorities. Bucharest believes that 
loyalty to the nation-state should be every citizen's primary concern, with citizen's 
rights running a distant second. 116 
114
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a. Germans 
Ethnic Germans in Romania can be divided into two main groups. The 
Lutheran Saxons came to Transylvania in the twelfth century from the Rhine and Mosel 
regions. Why they are called Saxon is now unknown. In the eighteenth century, 
Catholic Swabians from south-west Germany settled in Banat province. A sub-group, 
the Sathmar Swabians, live in the Satu Mare district of northern Transylvania. Austrian 
Landlers live in southern Transylvania as well. These groups made up an 800,000 
strong German community on the eve of World War II. 117 This number has been in 
constant decline ever since. One hundred thousand people emigrated to Germany from 
Bessarabia as part of the secret pact. Another 100,000 fled before the advancing Red 
Army in 1944. The victorious Soviets deported 75,000 to labor camps after the war, of 
which only 30,000 returned. Those who remained didn't fare much better. All the 
property of ethnic Germans was expropriated in 1945-48, and the ethnic communities 
v.·ere forced onto collectives. Thirty thousand more were relocated from the Yugoslav 
border to the east Danubian plain in "de-kulakisation" drives really intended to remove 
any internal threat on the volatile border with Tito. 
By 1967, the ethnic Germans began to rise above the other communities. 
Romania became the first East Bloc nation to normalize relations with West Germany. 
Ceausescu' s need for foreign currency fostered a deal in 1978 v.•hereby the Federal 
Republic of Germany paid 12,000DM per emigrant. The Romanians allowed 11,000 
Germans to leave each year, enabling over 130,000 to escape. 1 tE Between 1975 and 
1985, one third of the ethnic Germans living in Romania emigrated to the FRG. "Some 
villages in Transylvania literally became ghost towns." 11 9 Less than 250.000 ethnic 
Germans remained by 1989. The end of communism did little to halt the exodus. A 
surve:v in Bucharest taken one month after Ceausescu' s fall showed that 71 percent of 
the Gern1.an population were still determined to emigrate. while only 6 percent 
definitely intended to stay. The new government lifted all emigration restrictions, 
allowing the German communities to vote with their feet. According to Bonn. 111.150 
people emigrated in 1990 alone. Toda)', there are only 20,000 ethnic Germans 
remaining. 12 C1 
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The Romanian nationalist's desire for an ethnically pure Romanian state 
has backfired in the case of the Germans. The loss of the ethnically German people is 
now officially acknowledged to have damaged Romania's best interests .121 The 
emigration has resulted in the loss of the country's most educated and disciplined 
minority, particularly in the industrial sector. The lack of ethnic Germans in 
Transylvania has political ramifications as well. The Saxons provided a balancing factor 
between the Romanian and Magyar ethnic groups. acting as a mediator at times. The 
lack of this balancing factor is regretted by most members of the majority govermnent. 
The ethnic Germans remaining in Romania have been affected the most. 
The ethnic German communities fmd it increasingly difficult to maintain their cultural 
identity. Social structures that have existed intact for over seven centuries are in danger 
of disappearing. One such institution. the "neighborhood" system, obliges community 
members to help one another build houses, harvest crops, and the like for the 
betterment of the entire community. The loss of these social nets in a time of severe 
economic turmoil is devastating. The Romanian Lutheran Church is basically defunct. 
lacking parishioners and clergy alike. The German language school system and media 
are in trouble as well. Finally. the entire Romanian nation is appalled at the loss of 
ancient Romanesque and Gothic architecture found in many German communities. 
mving to lack of maintenance. !vlany of these villages have been taken over b~y the 
nomadic Gypsies, who show little appreciation for their value. 7ineretul Liber. a 
Bucharest daily. summed up the Romanian attitude when it v.·rote. "The Germans are 
leaving. and we are left to coexist '''ith the 'marvelous' swarthy kin." m The Germans 
no longer constitute an etlmic bloc to speak of. but tl1eir legacy will remain for some 
time. 
b. Gypsies 
The exact nun1ber of Gypsies (they prefer to be called Romas or 
Romanies) in Romania is unknown. Official statistics are skewed by the prejudices of 
census takers as well as the reluctance of many Romanies to openly declare themselves 
as such. Romanie leaders claim~ .3 million people. which is probably inflated. 
Romanies traditionally consider themselves as nomadic, although the fact is they· have 
been settled for several generations. Only 3 to 10% are still truly nomadic. There are 
;;:> 1Sha.fir. "Minorities Council ... " p. 36 . 
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three major bands, each bearing rather exotic names. The 'nomads and kettle smiths' 
located around Sibiu, the 'settled Gypsies and fiddlers' in Tirgu-Mures, and the 
'Hungarian-speaking and the silk' in Cltli· Note that all three locations are 
Transylvanian cities with large, multi-ethnic populations. Every ten years, the Great 
Lord of the Romanies is elected to lead the 40 distinct groups. With his headquarters in 
Sibiu, lulian (the current lord) is involved in inter-tribal disputes as well as acting as 
Romania's representative in international Romanie organizations. However, Romanie 
kings (as they refer to their leaders) have had little effect upon past governments. The 
Romanies have a long history of hardship that officially ended in the nineteenth century 
with the legal recognition of Gypsy equality, although the twentieth century has seen 
little improvement in their standard of living. The Romanies were victims of pogroms 
and the Holocaust. Slum housing. chronic unemployment, illiteracy and crime have 
been their lot. 123 
The Romanies gained new political rights after the December 1989 
revolution. In the past, the:y· had been denied recognition b:y· the government as an 
ethnic group. Today, they are creating political institutions to counter racial prejudice 
and to fight for their rights. Unfortunatel:y·. inter-ethnic harmony has not occurred. In 
fact. if there is one thing the ethnic Romanians and Mag_')·ars can agree upon. it is 
hatred of the Romanies. This sentiment reflects the perception of Romanies as a "social 
sore, inclined at birth to larceny, fraud, robbery. violent crime, and the like." 1=' 4 The 
xenophobic hatred is rampantly displayed in the press. "The Romanian media often 
depict Gypsies stereotypically as thieves. beggars and black marketers, or as people 
who do nothing but cast spells. make curses and foretell tl1e future." 125 The Romanies 
also make convenient scapegoats for all kinds of trouble. For instance, Ceausescu and 
his wife Elena are now considered to have been of Tatar Gypsey and Gypsey heritage 
respectively. Violence is associated the Romanies in part because of these attitudes. 
On 9 October 1990. 3~ Romanie houses were burned down or destroyed 
in a Transylvanian village. This marked the beginning of post-Ceausescu violence 
towards tl1e Romanies. In 1991, at least 24 different villages attacked their local 
Romanies, in most cases burning do\\'11 houses and forcing the clan to leave. The 
1='3Dan Ionescu. "The Gypsie5 Organize." RFE RL Research Rt:port. Vol. L No. 26. 29 June 1990. p. 
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blocx:lshed in Bolantin Deal provides a typical scenario of Romanie persecution. On 
Orthodox Easter night a member of the 'bear trainers' clan stabbed to death the 22 year 
old son of a local farming engineer. The next morning 6,000 townsfolk assembled to 
seek retribution against the 'bear trainers,' and not just the responsible individual. By 
this time the Romanies had fled to the wocx:ls, so only their property was harmed. A 
few days later, 34 clan members tried to return, managing to survive only after 
government authorities stopped a 2,000 strong l)nch mob from carrying out their plan. 
The townspeople later said that they hadn't wanted to kill the Romanies, just drive 
them away from their homes. 126 The Romanies are not taking things sitting down. The 
latest narrowly averted clash was initiated by Julian. The 'King' threatened to march 
with 30,000 followers on the offices of money-multiplying societies that have recently 
hit Romania. These pyramid games, similar to chain letters. have taken the money of 
many Gypsies and failed to pay off. m If the Romanies begin to fight back, the violence 
will escalate. Psychologically speaking. the other ethnic groups can not afford to grant 
the Romanies equality. This would be tantamount to admitting that they nov.' occupy 
the lowest rung of society. which is unacceptable to the various proud cultures. 
C. je\VS 
Romania has never been fond of its Je\\'S. In 1923 it was the last 
European nation to grant Jews citizenship. and then did so only under duress. Romania 
had the tl1ird largest pre-war Jewish population in Europe, numbering almost 
800,000. 128 Tcx:lay only 17,000 remain. Three hundred thousand perished in the 
Transdniester lagers of the Holocaust and thousands more emigrated to Israel after the 
war. Ceausescu maintained payment arrangements with Israel at the same time, and for 
the same reasons as witl1 West Germany. Israel paid handsomely for emigrants, and the 
United States upped the ante by granting Most Favored l\' ation status to Romania in 
return for its allowing the Jews to leave. 12~ The Jews were the only group under 
communism allowed to directly use foreign funds received in hard currency. As a 
1:>5Ionescu. "Violence Against Gn1sies ... " pp. :23 - 24. 
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result, active community institutions have been maintained through private lT.S. and 
Israeli contributions .130 However, a small Jewish population has not meant the end of 
Romanian anti-Semitism. 
The Romanian Prosecutor General recently ruled that neither the 
publication of Mein Kampf nor the activity of several extreme right parties was 
unlawful. This ruling would be fair in a society that recognizes free speech for all of its 
citizens, but Romania does not qualify as such. Immediately after the ruling, anti-
Semitic activity rapidly increased. 13 1 The disdain for Jews was imbedded in the East 
European culture long before communism arrived. However, today's behavior is 
justified as revenge for years of totalitarian rule. To the extremists, Judaism equals 
communism, and the 6 million victims of the Holocaust "pale in comparison to the 20 
million Romanian psychic victims of communism." 132 
The myth of the Je\\'S having orchestrated communism persists in 
Romania, but the facts contradict it. Gheorghe Dej purged most prominent Jewish RCP 
members at the same time many Magyars \\'ere removed. Pre-war elections shov.' that 
the bulk of the Jewish community voted for the democratic bourgeoisie parties, and 
never held a majority or even a plurality in the post-war governments.l33 Yet. the 
public imagination is "obsessed by the Jewish presence in the government, in 
parliament. in the press, television and God knows where else." i3" This situation 
persists despite the virtually total lack of Jewish citizens. The escalation of anti-
Semitism is most likely the result of economic hardship. and the resulting search for 
outside groups to blame in order to make the difficulties more palatable. 
3. Romanian Strategic Culture 
There are seven central elements of Romanian strategic culture. Each 
component has become so embedded within national traditions over time that it may 
constitute an in1pediment toward improved relations with other states. The following 
list includes a brief discussion of each point. 
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a. Intolerant nationalism based upon an inferiority complex. 
Throughout the Middle Ages being Romanian meant being a peasant or 
serf. Only the influx of Romanies in the sixteenth century prevented Romanians from 
occupying the lowest rung of the East European social ladder. The nationalism that 
began in Transylvania was based upon the goal of escaping this stigma and gaining real 
political rights. When the treaty of Trianon doubled the physical size of Romania 
overnight and bestowed upon it millions of people from an alien culture, it was more 
than many in Transylvania could tolerate. The former oppressors were now citizens in 
a country governed by what they deemed to be inferior Romanians. What's more, these 
new citizens demanded the very freedoms that they had previously denied the 
Romanians! 
The ethnic Romanians responded to the conceited attitudes of their new 
citizens by exacting revenge. and using the minorities as scapegoats for domestic 
problems. It soon became easier for the government to attack and ridicule the Magyars 
and other ill-perceived minorities (most notably the Romanies and Jews) by labeling 
them ethnically and culturally beneath the "true Romanians"as a means of acquiring 
public support, rather than attempting to overcome traditional stereotypes by 
incorporating the new citizens equally into Romanian society. Discrimination became 
an integral part of the Romanian national culture during the decades following the 
Trianon treaty. Thus. ethnic Romanians abused their newfm.md political po·wer by 
creating a nationalist ideology based more upon a hatred of other cultures than 
emphasizing the positive attributes of their own. This ideology has been handed down 
through the generations, reinforced by governments representing all sides of the 
political spectrum. Given this attitude. it is nearly impossible for Romania's current 
government to change the typical ethnic Romanian citizen's opinion of Romania's 
minorities in the near future. even if it were inclined to do so. 
b. Multi-ethnic state characterized by strong ethnic allegiances. 
For ethnic Romanians. cultural allegiance is a result of the national myth 
(Daco-Roman origins and pride in rising above repression) and the Treaty of Trianon. 
To the ethnic Romanians, loyalty to their culture is S}TIOn)'mous with loyalty to the 
state. Since Trianon, ethnic loyalty has intensified because of fear of minority power. 
The ethnic minorities advocate individual and collective rights to guarantee their 
cultural autonomy regardless of size. However. the ethnic Romanians view cultural 
autonomy in the Magyar case as being the first step toward reunification with Hungary. 
Therefore, they promote the idea of loyalty to the state over individual rights. 
c. Traditions of public conformity, passivity and deference to 
authority. 
The centuries of authoritarian rule under the Turks, the lack of 
westernizing influences such as the Enlightenment and reform, the lack of a middle 
class to champion individualism, the failure of the intelligentsia to act as a political 
opposition, the teachings of the Orthodox faith, and paranoia regarding supposed 
foreign designs all combined to create or perpetuate traditional peasant attitudes toward 
government. The communist legacy was therefore not merely one of instituting 
authoritarian control, but rather served to perpetuate a tradition, albeit in a stricter 
sense. The fear among democrats in post-revolutionary Romania is that democratic 
systems are predicated upon the existence of individual political thought, which 
conformity does not engender. These cultural traits endanger the existence of 
democracy within Romania, and underscore the potential for popular acceptance of 
another authoritarian regime. Such regimes in the past have portrayed Hungary and the 
Magyars as villains in order to unify the ethnic Romanians against a common threat. 
This pattern might be repeated under another authoritarian regime. Thus, the loss of 
democracy in Romania would probably worsen relations between the two states. 
d. Winner-take-all attitude toward domestic politics. 
Perhaps out of deference to the state. or due to the lack of experience 
with democracy, public opinion does not play a major role in in11uencing government 
policy. The govermnent also lacks institutionalized checks and balances. As a result, 
the ruling elite has total freedom of action once in power. This helps to explain 
Romania's history of quick and dramatic shifts in government from one extreme to the 
next. and the corruptness of these governments once seated. Since the appearance of 
"democracy" in 1989, there has been little evidence that this pattern has changed. The 
cultural traits of passivity. conformity, and deference to authority continue to obstruct 
the develop1nent of positive Hungarian-Romanian relations, even when Romania is 
taking some limited steps toward a democratic system of government. All of these traits 
inhibit support for opposition parties in general. and for those parties advocating 
minority rights reform in particular. 
45 
e. Traditionally an agricultural nation in which modern 
industry came relatively late. 
The various parts of Romania were traditionally used by the Ottomans 
and Habsburgs as a source of food for the more 'important' parts of the empires. The 
state continued to rely upon agricultural production as a source of wealth until World 
War II. Today Romania is dotted by factories within urban centers, but their 
employees maintain traditional agricultural roots. A typical worker lives in a rural 
village and commutes to work in order to earn hard currency for consumer goods, 
while his extended family engages in traditional chores necessary for basic life staples. 
Thus, traditional links to the village exist in Romania as well as in Hungary, despite 
improved communications within the country. However, the interactions among 
government institutions in Romania are more ill-defined than in Hungary. allowing 
greater freedom of action for local authorities. The village living standards are still 
low. These standards failed to improve during industrialization as a result of the 
hardships incurred in this rapid process. People who live outside the village community 
(including the central government l are still viewed warily. and foreign cultures are held 
in outright contempt. 'When all of these factors are combined. the power of "trusted" 
local authorities is greatly enhanced. to the point \\'here mayors and prefects have 
openly defied Bucharest. This environment effectively blocks attempts at national 
reform. 
f. Fear of external states and great power relations. 
The various territories constituting modem Romania were considered 
prizes in international disputes for centuries. Foreign rule was normal and not the 
exception. Furthermore. Romanian sovereignty failed to guarantee the integrity of the 
state after its independence. Its geographic location has made it virtually impossible to 
maintain neutrality in major power disputes. The Russo-Turkish wars, various Balkan 
conflicts. the two \\lorld ·wars. and the Cold War forced the state into armed conflict 
or confrontation. which usually resulted in occupation. Thus Romanians are extremel)' 
sensitive to perceived aggression and irredentism. Hungary's involvement in Romania's 
minority problems is seen as an intrusion in a sovereign issue. To many Romanians, 
Budapest appears to be following an aggressive diplomatic policy. This is considered 
evidence that Hungary still maintains irredentist designs upon Transylvania. 
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g. Questioning of the inviolability of borders. 
Romania failed to create a state or even a feeling of common nationality 
l.llltil the nineteenth century. Since the first days of the Unified Principalities. the 
territorial makeup of Romania has been questioned. Parcels of land and pockets of 
people have been shifted in and out of the country for all but the last thirty-nine years. 
Post-communist Romania appears to be receptive to the prospect of continuing this 
tradition. Romanians believed the rel.lllion of Moldova, partially made up of Bessarabia 
and Moldavia (historic "Romanian" lands) was imminent with that state's secession 
from the Soviet Union. Romanian fear of neighboring irredentist designs is not 
surprising. Bucharest appears to have no qualms about re-drawing international borders 
in its favor, and suspects its neighbors of harboring comparable ambitions. The 
Hungarian situation is no exception. The Romanian government l.llldoubtedly 
understands that Hungary might make persuasive claims to Transylvania on both 
historical and ethnic grounds. The loss ofT ransylvania is therefore considered a very 
distinct possibility to be guarded against at all times. This makes Romanian -
Hungarian relations extremely sensitive and difficult to improve. 
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lll. CONTEMPORARY DOMESTIC POLITICS 
A. HUNGARY 
In the spring of 1994 Hungary underwent its first democratic transition of 
government since the HSWP's departure. Two rounds of national elections took place 
with no major problems or incidents, and in both elections over 60% of eligible voters 
cast a ballot. 135 The new National Assembly was convened on 28 June 1994 by 
President Arpad Goncz, whose own five-year term expires in 1995. This parliament's 
makeup reflects a continuity with the past since all six parties represented made up the 
previous government, although in a different configuration. Furthermore, unlike other 
post-communist nations, an "overwhelming majority of Hungarians reject extremist 
views and favor parliamentary democracy." i36 Hungarian law stipulates that 5 percent 
of the vote is needed to get in parliament. Neither the extreme leftist Workers Party nor 
Istvan Csurka's semi-fascist Life Party came close to this cutoff.i37 The elected political 
elites agree that radical ideas pose a danger to democratic ideals, although they disagree 
on which side of the political spectrum harbors the greater threat. 138 All of these 
factors are positive indications that democratic values and practices are taking hold in 
Hungary, but the election returns possibly indicate otherv>'ise. 
The 326 seat Hungarian parliament is elected in part by constituency seats. with 
the rest coming from party lists ( 125). For the individual seats, 50 percent or more is 
needed by a candidate to win a seat outright in the first round. Otherwise. all 
candidates receiving 15 percent or more participate in a follow on election. Elections 
are held every four years. The 1990 government was formed by the conservative 
Hungarian Democratic Fonun (HDFl. which won 4~% of the seats in response to the 
fall of communism. 139 In 1994 the HDF came in third by only attaining 38 seats, and 
was soundly defeated by the Hungarian Socialist Party's (HSP) 209 members. In 
addition. the Alliance of Free Democrats IAFDJ garnered 70 more seats and became 
135Judith Pataki, "Hungary's New Palliament Inaugurated," RFE RL Research Rm;>ort. Vol. 3, No. 29, 
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the HSP' s junior coalition partners. The Socialists now have an absolute parliamentary 
majority, and their coalition has the absolute two-thirds majority which is needed by 
law to pass important legislation. 140 Thus, the 1994 election effectively put the pre-
revolutionary leaders back in power. 
1. Hungarian Political Parties 
The Hungarian Socialist Party was fanned in 1989 by Janos Kadar and other 
former communists, including its current head Gyula Horn. The party is the direct 
descendant of the Socialist Workers Party which ruled under communism, although a 
fringe party still maintains the HSWP name. The HSP presents itself as a rejuvenated 
party of professional politicians concerned with pragmatic tasks rather than past 
ideologies. It ran and won on the slogans "Let the Experts govern" and bring back 
those who "know how to make government work.";,; 1 The extent to which the HSP 
changed from 1989 to 1994 appears limited. Old commtmist party functionaries 
continue to hold posts throughout the organization. and the party has yet to "defme a 
clear stance on the legacy of Karl Marx" and the communist ideology in general.
142 
The HSP is internally divided into four factions over the role communism and 
other past ideas should play in the modern party. Horn leads the strongest group, which 
is made up of ex-apparatchik officials who identify themselves as 'technocrats.' Matyas 
Szuros, the HS\VP Foreign Affairs Secretary before Horn, continues to be Horn's chief 
political rival within the party. Szuros leads the 'national left wing platform' whose 
fundan1ental interest rests upon the fate of Mag_yar minorities abroad and the historical 
position of the nation. Szuros bitterly criticized HSP attacks upon the previous 
government. reportedly without offering solutions to the issues; and it is his faction 
which periodically threatens to leave the party. A third \ving calling itself the 'liberal 
social democratic platform' is led by the Chairman of the HSP's National Board, Ivan 
Vitanyi. Vitanyi's group represents the more moderate elements of the HSP and 
advocates closer cooperation with other liberal parties, especially the AFD. Finally, a 
historian named Tanws Krausz is recognized as the spokesman for the members 
politically positioned to the left of Horn. Little is known about Krausz's supporters as 
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they espouse no particular political agenda.t43 It is unknown how unified the party is in 
light of these factions. Of the 209 HSP deputies elected, 149 came from individual lists 
and will probably be more concerned with their constituent interests than party 
discipline. 144 
The Free Democrats (AFD) under Gabor Kuncze became the HSP's coalition 
partners after the elections, in part because they were the only party willing to join the 
socialists. Kuncze's party advocates an agenda based upon three goals: European 
integration, regional cooperation, and a policy supporting Magyars abroad. The AFD 
favors an early start to EU negotiations and seeks consultative rights in Europe's main 
political and security institutions (that is, NATO and the EU) prior to full membership. 
This party wants Hungary to obtain full NATO membership after serving a fev.·· years 
in the PFP program, and regards a nation wide referendum on joining the EU as 
unnecessary, although the AFD will not oppose such a vote if a large majority of the 
population demands one. The AFD has criticized the previous government for its 
narrow-minded focus on regional etlmic rights, claiming that such a program 
unnecessarily strains international relations and has tarnished Hungary's image abroad. 
Kuncze and his followers emphasize a program fostering reconciliation with Hungary's 
neighbors. It involves economic accords and cultural relations and is intended to build a 
foundation of tmst and cooperation. The AFD vie\vs bilateral treaties as a means to 
reach mutual understanding and not as an end in themselves. and they have stated their 
belief that H1..mgary has no territorial claims whatsoever. Therefore. the Free 
Democrats do not oppose treaty clauses concerning the inviolability of existing state 
borders. However, the AFD does insist upon affirming minority language rights in 
education. as well as cultural and religious freedom and political representation in any 
such treaties.t45 In summary, tl1e AFD' s agenda centers on friendship with Hungary's 
neighbors. but the party continues to attach the same conditions on improving relations 
as its predecessors, without adding anything new of substance. 
The Democratic Fomm (HDF) took office in 1990 under Prime l'vlinister Joszef 
Antall. An tall's leadership was politically controversial because of his commitment to 
the Magyars abroad. At one point he even went so far as to declare himself the "Prime 
143Ibid .. pp. 22- 23. 
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Minister in spirit of 15 million Hungarians, ''1 46 even though the nation has only 11 
million citizens. Peter Bouross, who succeeded Antall after his death in December 
1993, has continued the policies of his predecessor. When the Socialist party began to 
reassert itself in politics, Bouross stressed the need to hold former communists 
accountable for pre-1990 events and attempted to emphasize Christian values and 
Hungary's historical importance. The HDF failed to understand the attitudes of the 
people, whose concerns focused on the needs of daily life under harsh economic 
conditions and not on philosophical arguments about past injustices. 147 The incessant 
quarreling within the HDF added to the socialists' image as a relatively professional 
organization. 148 The conservatives' political clout is all but gone, with only 38 
Assembly seats. 
2. HSP-AFD Governance 
Gyula Horn is now the Prime Minister of Hungary. Horn's communist party 
affiliations include a university education in the Soviet Union and decades spent in the 
party apparatus. In 1956 he was a member of the citizen militia which helped the 
communist troops mop up anti-Communist resistance. Horn's political detractors argue 
that he became interested in reform in the early 1980's only as a means of saving the 
party from destruction. not because of ideological convictions. HO\vever, Horn is 
credited with heavily influencing then Prime Minister Nemeth to allow the East 
Gennan emigration from Htmgary in 1989, while acting as the last communist Foreign 
Minister in Hungary. This act and his personal magnetism make him a very popular 
politician. 149 Horn's political popularity is not the only reason for the socialist return to 
power. The public's grO\:~;ing dissatisfaction \Vith rising unemplo:vment and the 
simultaneous decrease in prcx:l.uction and living standards hurt the HDF. while nostalgic 
memories of full employment and the social welfare net provided by the state under 
communism bolstered widespread support for the HSP .1sc 
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During the campaign the HSP declared that they had no intention of returning to 
a centrally planned economy or single party state. They vowed to respect the existing 
property relations, including the restoration of former Church properties begun by the 
conservatives, and pledged to continue the privatization process under parliament's 
guidance. iS! The HSP also said they would continue government compensation for 
victims of political repression and property expropriation by the communists. However, 
Horn has criticized the plan. which entails handing out coupons to the victims (with 
which they can purchase shares in state-owned industry. among other things), as being 
a boost to the black market. 152 
The HSP's foreign affairs platform is similar to that of their Free Democrat 
partners. The socialists advocate a regional approach and seek to utilize the current 
international climate to their advantage. stressing to neighboring countries that all of 
their futures are closely interwoven. and emphasizing the need to avoid overestimating 
Hungary's importance in the region. The essence of their agenda on attaining security 
is to avoid making enemies by embracing all states on friendly terms. This is to be 
achieved by downplaying the sensitive topic of !v1agyar minority rights in neighboring 
states while promoting reconciliation through state treaties confirming the inviolability 
of borders and Hungary's commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Like the 
AFD, the socialists do not outright reject Budapest's role as the Magyar protector, but 
rather they seek protection for minority rights in conformity with European nonns. 
The HSP wants Hungary to obtain full membership in NATO and the EU. 
supports the PFP initiative. and believes in the need for a national referendum on the 
relinquishing of a measure of state sovereignty to the El'. The HSP has said in the past 
that it wants NATO membership only if all other states in the region (Russia included) 
are offered the same deal. This coincides with the socialist regional outlook on the 
international system. since solo Hungarian, or even the inclusion of all four Visigrad 
states in NATO and the EU \\'ould separate East-Central Europe into two groups of 
nations (full versus associate members of the EU and NATO). The HSP argues that a 
divided region would lead to distrust and potential new conflicts. lowering local 
stability and threatening Hungary's security. even though integration into NATO and 
the EU would foster a feeling of security and improve economic conditions within the 
151 01tay. "Fonner Communists ... " p. 3. 
1520ltay. "The Former Communllit's Election Victo:r} in Hungary." RFE RL Research Rmort. Vol. 3. 
No. 25. 24 June 1994, p. 5. 
53 
integrated states, effectively extending the West European area of stability into East-
Central Europe. The new government's international strategy therefore follows three 
stages. The fostering of friendly relations is intended to improve the regional economy 
and to promote stability in political institutions. The socialists envision that this in tum 
may allow Hungary and its neighbors to become full members within the EU, WEU 
and NATO, ultimately improving the fate of the Magyars abroad. 153 
A pre-election survey by the Szonda lpsos polling group asked 1 ,009 Budapest 
residents about their views on a non-coalition government. 53% percent remarked that 
an HSP-only government would be bad for the country, and nationwide surveys 
routinely find that over 80% prefer coalition governments to those of one party. 154 It is 
therefore not surprising that the HSP sought to include the AFD in governing the 
country despite having a dear majority. This coalition helps the socialists legitimize 
themselves at home and -more importantly- abroad, by avoiding the return of a single-
party state. Furthermore, the coalition has the added benefit of allowing the AFD party 
to share the burden of responsibility for harsh economic measures to come. The HSP is 
keenly aware of what toppled the conservatives at the polls and so they seek to avoid 
the same fate. Meanwhile, tl1e Free Democrats view the coalition as the only way to 
maintain an opposition voice in government. given the HSP's landslide victory. !v1ajor 
legislation requires a two-thirds vote. giving the AFD limited leverage within tl1e 
coalition. However. Gabor Kuncze stated before the elections that if the HSP gained an 
absolute majority, the AFD \\'Ol.Ud not be strong enough to represent the interest of its 
constituents. 155 During the passage of a lav.• concerning the appointment of new state 
media heads. one of the first political battles within the new parliament, the opposition 
and the AFD both failed to influence the HSP' s decisions. This sparked renewed fears 
that the socialists will disregard the legitimate concerns of the opposition entirely, 
which is tantamount to a return of single-party rule.;:;.< 
The opposition has other concerns about the HSP-dominated government!. The 
dose links between the socialists i primarily Hom's wing) and the National Association 
of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZl is alanning. The MSZOSZ's origins in the 
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communist National Council of Trade Unions have not gone unnoticed. That body was 
deeply involved in the implementation of HSWP decisions throughout the communist 
era. The MSZOSZ's affiliation with government nurtures fears that the unions will 
support policies slowing down economic reforms, promoting greater job security, and 
demanding higher government social spending. This spending would be funded through 
increased taxes on the business class, taxes which could in turn stifle economic growth. 
The power of the trade unions is so potentially overwhelming that it could even tip the 
balance within the socialist party toward the left, weakening the political influence of 
those members still inclined to support reform. Finally, the restoration of the old party 
apparatus in conjunction with union support may signal the return of the old client-
patron system removed in 1990. This system of institutionalized nepotism allowed party 
members to thoroughly entrench themselves in power. A return to this system would 
hamper capitalism and go against basic democratic and capitalist principles. 157 
Horn and the HSP are busy consolidating their power in the legislature. The 
HSP replaced the old parliamentary procedures (left over from the unitary party state) 
with procedures more favorable to themselves. and have adopted rules strictly 
enforcing party discipline. The opposition sees this as a clear move to curtail their 
rights, and a way to hinder defections by individual HSP seat holders from the party 
line. The power of the ruling coalition is such that it can easily amend laws and the 
constitution itself. The HSP has the power. although not the political motive (in current 
and foreseeable circumstances). to legally reinstate the single-party state. 158 
3. Assessment 
Prime Minister Horn is apparently content to limit his leadership to the Magyars 
living within Hungary's borders. This is a positive sign: it suggests that Romanian-
Hungarian relations may yet improve. Horn met briefl)' with his Romanian counterpart 
in Trieste on 17 July 1994 and tried to conve:y his new approach to the issues. 
However, clashes in Transylvania bet\l.'een the authorities and Magyars just prior to the 
visit effectively undermined any chance for a fresh start. 159 Horn, like his predecessor, 
is too politically weak to go against popular sentiment regarding the importance of 
minority issues - despite his party's electoral clout. 
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The HSP' s hold on political power is tentative. Public support for the 
government could evaporate if the economic hardship endured by the people since 
reforms began became a wasted effort. This could happen if the Socialists backed awa,y 
from strict reform measures, thereby losing whatever ground was gained under 
privatization. Social tensions and labor disputes over the means of reform could further 
split the party, destabilizing the government and removing the legislative leverage Horn 
currently enjoys. 16° Even Horn's political base, the MSZOSZ, could withdrav.• its 
support from the government if it felt that issues important to it were not being 
addressed. The return to political power of former communists who constituted the 
privileged class under communism could also hinder real attempts at socialist reform in 
foreign and domestic politics. The communist politicians proved to be more interested 
in the preservation of personal power than in tackling the nation's problems in the past: 
and this may turn out to be the case for many of the former communists who now call 
themselves socialists. 
The new government will probably continue economic reform. but at a much 
slower pace. Some allegiance must be shown to the MSZOSZ causes for political 
reasons. Ho\vever, most of the former communist leaders are now the primary 
beneficiaries of privatization. These men had the capital to invest. and the personal 
connections as a result of their political positions to become the heads of factories and 
private enterprises. Therefore they have the most to lose in canceling reforms half way 
through. The real fear about HSP pov.'er is that it may signal the return of the client-
patron relations of the past. especially in light of the new entrepreneurial interests of 
the former party apparatchiks. I 61 
It is also unlikely that a major shift in international relations will occur as a 
result of Horn's leadership. \Vestern nations are skeptical about the return of the former 
conummists to power. This could negatively influence foreign investment and hinder 
Hungary's integration with \Vestern institutions. The HSP' s regional outlook is 
farsighted but unrealistic in the current security climate. General disagreements 
bet\veen Hungary and its neighbors continue on a variety of issues. Both states involved 
in a dispute must want a settlement before an accord can be reached. Horn's ability to 
change the current situation is weakened by his party's internal dissension and the lack 
of a dear mandate for a new foreign policy. The Socialist return to power was 
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prompted by a domestic backlash, and not general disgruntlement with the HFD' s 
foreign agenda. Finally, many issues are complicated b)' the domestic pressures on 
foreign leaders. For example, a change in the general attitude of Romanians towards 
minorities must occur before laws enacted by Bucharest are enforced or even 
promulgated. "Hungarian foreign policy is unlikely to undergo any radical change until 
all of the parties involved, governments and minorities, are prepared to make mutually 
acceptable and beneficial compromises." 162 
B. ROMANIA 
The Romanian political scene is fraught with many problems. The lack of 
clearly defined separations of power and authority between the central administration 
and local government, and between the legislative. judicial and executive branches 
within the central government has created widespread political confusion. 1(·3 The lack 
of firm government control at the local level has facilitated vigilante-type justice. 
The growing unpopularity of the central government suggests that the legal 
system may not be able to control civil disobedience. For example. President Ion 
lliescu was booed, protested and jeered by a crowd during a recent visit to tl1e "martyr 
city" of Timisoara. The highl)· organized affair (reminiscent of Ceausescu) in which 
lliescu visited the barracks v.•here 13 young persons were murdered during the 1989 
revolution. followed by a wreath-laying ceremony at tl1e Cemetery of Martyred Heroes, 
was designed to foster public support and sympathy for the government. !f.~ A recent 
poll even suggests that 68% of the people want a change in governn1ent as a \vay of 
settling tl1e current political crises. !c5 
Elected officials are also unhappy with the current state of affairs. In June 1994 
the opposition parties moved to defeat Iliescu and his government through a motion of 
no confidence and corresponding initiatives to impeach the President. The 
parliamentary move failed by a vote of ~'2.7 to 208 on 30 June. Si.x days later 
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impeaclnnent proceedings were overturned for lack of grounds by the Romanian 
Supreme Court.166 Iliescu's political unpopularity, coupled with his unwillingness to 
yield power, has forced the President ever closer to the extreme end of the political 
spectrum. "Iliescu obviously does not wish to change the current political 
situation .... Regardless of how deep the crisis, he is not prepared to give up on them 
[the extremists], as he is not prepared to give up the reins of power either. although he 
knows that a reshuffle of the political spectrum would be beneficial for the country." 167 
1. Romanian Political Parties 
Romanian politics is a "fur ball" of fragmented parties and factions that 
constantly change names as they form and leave coalitions. Romania is currently 
governed by a coalition group called the Party of Social Democracy of Romania 
(PDSR). The PDSR was known as the Democratic National SalYation Front until July 
1993. Anotl1er, more radical organization named the Romanian National Unity Party 
(PRNUJ backs the government and participates in ruling the state. The PDSR is 
dependent upon the PRNll in the legislature. President lliescu is considered a 
pragmatic politician \\'ho is prin1arily concerned with keeping the moderates and hard-
liners witl1in the government happy. As a result. lliescu shies away from single-party 
politics. This is left to Prime l\-linister ;\'icolae Vacaroiu. leader and mouthpie<..--e of the 
PDSR. 168 
Gheorghe Funar heads tl1e extreme nationalist PR.'\;li. which is itself a coalition 
foffi1ed in December 1993 with tl1e Democratic Agrarian Party. Funar's political views 
center around his unbending stance on the preeminency of loyalty to the state. During 
one heated exchange in Cluj. Funar told !vlag_yar political representatiYes who were 
unhappy over ethnically motivated ordinances to "get it into your heads that you are 
here in Ron1a11ia .. .If you do not like it. gentle111en. Hungary is dose enough. and the 
right to emigrate is guaranteed by the constitution." '"' 9 The Agrarian party. among 
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other things, is against economic reforms forced on Romania by "foreign agents in the 
IMF. "170 
The Democratic Convention (CDR) is the mainstream opposition coalition. The 
leftist National Communists support the CDR, but the National Liberal Party (NLP) 
and its offshoots form the bulk of the opposition. The NLP was revived after 
Ceausescu's defeat by returning emigres and old liberal veterans who had been banned 
from political activity under communism. Its leader, Radu Campeanu, was himself 
exiled to Paris after suffering years of hardship in labor camps. The NLP advocates 
restoration of individual rights, freedom of religion, equal rights of minorities, rapid 
privatization of agriculture, and the gradual privatization of industry. Campeanu lost 
the 1990 presidential election to Iliescu, and the party failed to qualify in the 1992 
parliamentary elections due to internal struggles over leadership and generational 
conflicts. The NLP has officially withdrawn from the CDR. but remnant splinter 
groups of the party remain. "In view of the Romanian liberal movement's current 
fragmentation, the task of unifying it appears a formidable one." 17 1 However, there is 
hope in the growing number of young intellectuals interested in the movement. 172 
Since the NLP's break-up, perhaps the strongest party within the opposition 
camp (CDR) is the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (HDFRl. This 
minority party is actually another coalition of different interest groups. Hov.•ever, 
unlike other groups, the HDFR maintains considerable party discipline because of the 
threat of Romanian extremists. and the bond of a common Magyar cause rather than 
allegiance to any particular leader. Cohesiveness has its drawbacks, since the HDFR is 
perceived as threatening by many Romanians who fear minority power. 173 However. 
the HDFR is not immune to internal strife. The internal struggle that plagues the HDFR 
centers around two factions. The moderate group backs the party President. Bela 
Marko, while the radical hero. Bishop Laszlo Tokes, speaks for the rest. 17 4 It was 
Tokes' lambasting of Ceausescu' s treatment of the ethnic minorities that served as the 
catalyst for the events leading to the 1989 Romanian revolution. 175 The moderates 
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prevailed until recently, but Tokes' support grew after a compromise with the 
government over bilingual street signs fell through, just as he predicted. Since then, the 
HDFR has reflected Tokes' doubts about the government's honesty and genuine 
concern in dealing with minority problems. !?6 
There are three other political movements of importance. The Democratic 
Forum of Germans in Romania (DFGR) was established in January 1990. Although 
nominally an ethnic association vice a true political party, the group does engage in 
political activities. The DFGR is somewhat pro-government, but it also advocates 
measures such as a comprehensive minority law, dual citizenship, and the restitution of 
land confiscated under communism. The ultimate goal of the Germans is to re-organize 
into several compact settlements in order to protect their social, economic and cultural 
activities. High-ranking officials, including the president, have received Germans in the 
past in order to discuss possible solutions to their particular problems. The government 
has shown sympathy for most of the DFGR's claims, with the exception of continued 
separate schools, because the government \Vants to avoid setting a precedent for 
Magyar demands. 177 The existence of the DFGR could potentially furnish a basis for 
continuing the tradition of German mediation between the other ethnic groups, although 
its voice has been substantially weakened by the German population decline in 
Romania. 
The Romanies have also formed a political party in an attempt to protect their 
individual and collective rights. as well as to foster ties with the international Gypsy 
community. The Democratic Union of Romanies in Romania (DURR) is the largest of 
six Gypsy parties. Ion Onoriu is the President. with the "King of the Gypsies," lulian. 
acting as deputy. The DURR is pro-lliescu. having supported his presidential 
candidacy. 17 8 One fmal political faction that probably receives more attention in the 
Western press than in Romania centers on the deposed monarchy. Former King 
Michael IL who nov.· resides in Switzerland. is the rallying symbol for some royalists 
who believe that he could reconstitute the fabled 'Greater Romania.' However, the 
royalists are a marginal group at best. The Romanians voted ovenvhelmingly for a 
176Shafi.r and Ionescu. "Romania ... " 
177Da.n Ionescu. "Countdown for the German1\·1inority?" RFE RL Rt[Jort on Eastern Eurqpe. Vol. 2. 
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republican constitution in the referendum of 1990, and President Iliescu has stated that 
Michael's return as anything other than an ordinary citizen is out of the question. 179 
2. Extreme Nationalism in Romania 
There are two types of nationalism in today's world. One is based on 
nationalism as a prejudice, such as racism or clanism. This form is characterized by a 
tendency to serve the family or clan at the expense of others, who are perceived to 
infringe upon it. The French and American revolutions brought with them a second 
type of nationalism, characterized by the belief that all people are equal and have 
certain inalienable rights. This type of nationalism is more in line with healthy 
patriotism. as it espouses the idea that no nation is intrinsically superior to any other. 
but it still fosters loyalty to one's own country. 12':' 
Modern Romanian nationalism. as noted before. is based upon attitudes of 
superiority over people who are not ethnic Romanians. The years of totalitarian rule 
under both left and rightist govennnents aggravated these attitudes. Ceausescu' s 
communism depended upon nationalist allegiance as a legitimizing influenL--e, but it is 
only one of the factors in the survival of hyper-nationalist tendencies in Romania. 
Other reasons include the perceived threat of Htmgarian irredentism. the violent 
disintegration of neighboring multi-ethnic states such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, and the nation's protective tendencies towards infant !vloldovan independence. 
especially when this appears threatened by Russia.:~: 
About one :year after Ceausescu' s falL the first signs of re-emerging prejudice 
began to appear. Vile anti-Semitic articles were published by groups referring to 
themselves as the modern Iron Guard. The authors claimed to be avenging their 
comrades who had fallen under communism (\vhich is blamed on the minorities) and in 
reaction to an international Jewish conspiracy. The authenticity of the authors as old 
17
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members of the Guard is doubtful, since many of the supposed "facts" in the articles 
are incorrect. 182 However, the re-emergence of past sentiments is indisputable. 
The PRNU, based primarily in Transylvania, is at the forefront of radical 
opinions. This party has mastered the technique of playing upon culturally based 
nationalist fears for its own purposes. A vicious circle exists in Romanian politics as a 
result of the deep mistrust ethnic Romanians have of their fellow citizens who are from 
ethnic minorities; the latter fear the former. \Vhenever one side makes a move, the 
other interprets the action through its own perceptual lens, which usually distorts the 
significance of the move. The second group then counteracts, exacerbating the original 
problem without coming close to a solution. Radicals use and encourage this cycle for 
their own advantage, maneuvering to gain ever-increasing right-wing support. 
Much of the popular apprehension between Hungarians and Romanians is a 
result of nationalist history. Early history has been retold by both countries to suit their 
respective purposes, while modem history is used to document specific crimes 
attributed to the opposing side. For example. a 1993 Romanian study dedicated to the 
''unbiased" history of TranS)'lvania concludes by stating unequivocally that 
Transylvania \\'as first settled by the Romanian people of Daco-Romanian origin and 
then "penetrated" by the Hungarians. 18 .3 The authors then proceed to state that ''in 
Romania the Mag_')lars are not oppressed and persecuted, quite the contrary, we may say 
that obstacles are put in the ·way of the cultural and religious development of the 
Romanian[s] by those Magyars and Szeklers who did not give up the chauvinistic and 
revisionist practices [of the past]." 184 The book ends by admonishing all Hungarian 
scholars to "tell the TRUTH to the entire Hungarian nation." t85 The trouble is 
reconciling these historical accounts to a common point from which to \vork. "As long 
as historical controversies continue to dominate contemporary politics, Transylvania 
will be open to political manipulation by interests who have everything to gain from 
prolonging sterile quarrels and much to fear from the onset of a political agenda 
concerned with tackling problems that know no ethnic bounds." ;s 6 
18
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The first post-revolutionary social unrest in Romania occurred in March 1990. 
Relative ethnic harmony existed until this time. Violent clashes between ethnic 
Romanians and Hungarians in Tirgu-Mures exploded at the very moment when 
neighboring Moldova was discussing autonomy from the Soviet Union and eventual re-
unification with Romania. The Moldavian SSR was formed by the Soviets after World 
War II by carving up several territories. To the old Moldavian ASSR on the left bank 
of the Dniester river was added the central portions of Bessarabia. The northern and 
southern portions of that region, in addition to northern Bukovina, were given to 
Ukraine. The Moldavian ASSR was itself created from Ukrainian lands after the 
Russian civil war. 
As a result of this shuffle, Moldova is also an ethnically mixed state. Right bank 
Moldovans are ethnically Romanian, while the left bank Moldovans feel they are a 
unique Latin-based nationality, ov.-ing to a separate culture developed over the centuries 
while part of the Russian and Soviet empires. There are also large numbers of Russian-
speaking Slavs in the area. The left bank declared its own independence from Moldova 
and established the "Dniester Republic." One of the driving forces behind this split was 
the minorities' fear of treatment at the hands of the Romanians in a greater Romanian 
state. 187 The Tirgu-Mures clashes underscored the discriminatoi)· treatment of 
Romania's minorities. Indeed. radical nationalists have claimed that the violence was 
incited by the ethnic minorities in a successful effort to dissuade the !v1oldovan 
minorities .188 
Romanian hyper-nationalism is not confined to purifying and unifying present 
day Romania. The old dreams of attaining a 'Greater Romania' still exist. For example, 
most ethnic Romanians today believe that rv1oldova belongs to their nation. The Second 
Soviet Congress of People's Deputies declared the Ribbentrop-!v1olotov pact illegal at 
the same tin1e as the Romanian revolution. This led to widespread euphoria because the 
Romanian people interpreted this decision as an annulment of Bess arabia's annexation 
from the Old Kingdom. \Vhen time proved this wrong. a unification movement 
developed. led by Bessarabian intellectuals who had t1ed during the war . This 
movement demanded that Romania absorb Moldova. and Ukrainian Bessarabia. as well 
as the Transdniester (even though the latter territoi)· had never been a part of 
187Fal Kolsw and Andrei Edems.h.")' with Natalya Kalashnikova. "The Dniester Conflict: Bet\veen 
Inedentism and Seperatism." Eur01-1e-Asia Studies. Vol. 45. Ko. 6. 199-~. pp. 980- 81. 
188Cazacu, "Roundtable: ... " p. 30. 
Romania), into the unitary state. These nationalists wanted to 'have their cake and eat it 
too' by arguing on separate grounds for each region. The annexed territories are 
claimed using legal precedent, while the Transdniester is argued for on demographic 
grounds, even though the Moldovans there don't claim Romanian ties. 189 
Meanwhile, a public opinion survey taken in mid-1994 indicates that the number 
one fear in Romania is Hungarian aggression. 59 percent believed Hungary was 
"dangerous" and 4lpercent considered Hungary a potential aggressor. Yet Hungary 
could claim Transylvania on grounds similar to Romania's Moldovan claims. The same 
survey found Russia the second largest potential aggressor with 17% , Serbia 9% , and 
Ukraine 3% . 190 The fear of external intrusions persists, despite other states stressing the 
lack of border disputes with Romania. Anton Melescanu, the Romanian Foreign 
Minister, went so far as to chastise Ukraine over issues identical to Hungarian 
complaints. Melescanu said that he "cannot watch indifferently the degradation or 
destruction of Romanian vestiges and historical monuments in Ukraine's territory. and 
the measures that prevent the free expression of the Romanian's opinions." 191 These 
words, and the fact that one-third of Romanians live outside Romania's current 
borders, suggest that the different sides could agree on the treatment of minorities as a 
common concern. Nevertheless. the nationalistic prejudice in Romania prevents the 
government from seeing events from an objective perspective. 
3. Romanian Politics in Action 
Romanian political life is as complex as the s:;·stem of political parties. All of 
the volatile elements of society - nationalism. economics, ethnic differences. 
international atL\:ieties, and the lack of constitutional clarity - come together in this 
arena. Elections. the most basic of democratic principles, are probably affected the 
most. The May 199~ Tirgu-:rv1ures elections are an example of the turmoil. Stefan Kali 
Kiraly, the HDFR mayoral candidate. was removed from the electoral list by a court 
acting on right-wing allegations. The PR.J.'\;l' accused Kiraly of unpatriotic activity. 
They claimed that he had led a group of Hungarians in seizing a bakery during the 
1990 clashes. and that Kiraly had broken into the local cm.mcil' s headquarters on 22 
18 ?J<o1Bt0, Edems1._-y and Kalashnikova. 
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191 "l\1elescanu on Romanians :in Gktaine. Elsewhere." FBIS Da:il;v Report. FBIS-EEC'-94-014-A, 21 Jan. 
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December 1989. Even though both charges were ridiculous (he had suffered a beating 
by ethnic Romanians and was hospitalized during the bakery takeover, and the second 
allegation was tantamount to condemning the entire Bucharest government since the 
overthrow of Ceausescu, and Iliescu's subsequent rise to power, occurred under similar 
circumstances on the same day), the court backed the PRNU, and ignored an appeal by 
the Romanian Prosecutor General in support of the HDFR. Despite this, the ethnic 
Hungarians switched candidates and still managed to win with 53% of the vote and 14 
of 26 seats. However, the affair was not settled. The new mayor was forced to resign 
when an electoral commission discovered that voter fraud, albeit unintentional, had 
been committed. A second election administered by the central government fmally 
settled the issue in favor of the ethnic Hungarian minority . 192 
The HDFR's victory prevented further violence in Turgu-Mures. but the 
minorities have not always been as fortunate. The mayoral elections in Cllli· a city of 
25% ethnic Hungarians, were won by none other than Gheorge Funar. aforementioned 
head of the radical PRNU. The campaign was run on ethnic fears from the start. and 
his victory worsened relations. Claiming to be searching for hoarded gocxls sent to the 
Hungarian Church from abroad and redistributed to the masses, Funar had the police 
break into and search several churches and private residences. The searches were brutal 
and included the ripping up of floorboards and the like. Eventually the police \\'ere 
forced to admit that they had been looking for weapons on a tip from the Romanian 
lntelligenl--e Service. This led to an outcry by the HDFR, which has always been 
critical of the service's discriminatory activity. Next, Funar ordered all Hungarian-
language signs, placards, and posters to be removed. including street signs. 
Furtl1ermore, all announcements and advertisements henceforth had to be in Romanian. 
Fines for non-compliance were assessed every second day. This led Funar to joke that 
he was "contributing to overcoming the country's fmancial crisis." 1 ;,;:. Hungarian-
language meetings and media were later banned as well, since "Hungarian separatists 
could use them to send secret messages to Budapest. '' 1 ?4 F unar' s actions were based on 
a selective (if not illegal! reading of the constitution and la\vs, but the central 
government was forced to tolerate such actions because of lliescu' s need for PRNU 
support to maintain power. 
192Shafir. "Transylvanian Shadows ... " pp. 31 - 33. 
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Bucharest has also been known to directly interfere with local administration at 
the behest of minorities as well. The counties of Harghita and Covasna have ethnic 
Hungarian minorities which make up 84.6% and 75.2% of the population respectively. 
In July 1992, the ethnic Hungarian Prefects were removed in both counties in favor of 
ethnic Romanians. Prefects, unlike mayors and local council members, are direct 
representatives of the central government at the local level. The public reaction was so 
strong that joint prefects were established ten days later. The unprecedented move of 
having two prefects, one an ethnic Romanian and one an ethnic Hungarian. further 
clouded lines of authority and did little to appease the local population. Bucharest 
claimed that the action was taken because the original prefects were members of the 
HDFR, an opposition party, and therefore could not represent the PDSR fairly. What 
wasn't considered was the appointment of non-HDFR ethnic Hungarians to the posts, 
or at the very least, mainstream Romanian politicians instead of extreme nationalists. 
These appointments led to the further hardening of the HDFR' s stance. swaying more 
moderates toward Tokes' position. The entire affair illustrated the dangerous reaction 
cycle of Romanian politics, which may undermine regional stability.
195 
4. Assessment 
The continuing escalation of the war of words among Romania's political parties 
blocks any pragmatic approach by the govenunent to correct the social ills of the 
country. The tension between the institutional establislnnent and the Mag_vars is 
compounded b:y the fact that animosity toward ethnic minorities runs across Romanian 
party lines. The Law on Education illustrates this point. This legislation omitted the 
right to native language instruction at all levels of public education and vocational 
training, and failed to reinstate government financing of education in minority Church 
schools. In addition. private schools are henceforth required to teach history, 
geography and civic education courses solely in the Romanian language. The HDFR 
challenged the bill in Parliament, but their amendments were defeated by a vote of 206 
to 39 as a result of their fellmv opposition members (who are ethnic Romanian) 
aligning \vith the nationalists. 196 
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The PDSR' s opposition is in disarray. The aftermath of the June 1994 initiatives 
brought inter-party divisions into the open and revealed their inability to unite or to 
enforce some semblance of party discipline.197 Meanwhile, lliescu' s hold on power is 
also tenuous. There are indications that the majority of PDSR members are aware of 
the need for moderation and compromise with the minorities in order to ease the 
tension which endangers relations with the West and thus endangers Romania's future 
prosperity. Yet, Prime Minister Vacaroiu's dependence upon Funar's party prevents 
improvements in inter-ethnic affairs and in bilateral relations with Hungary, for the 
warming of relations would undermine the PRNU's basic tenets and call into question 
their very existence. 198 A link in this cycle of mistrust must be broken before the 
Romanian government can, in good faith. enter negotiations with Hungary over the 
removal of impediments to a cordial relationship. 
19
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IV. CURRENT ISSUES 
A. BILATERAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS 
The primary source of Hungarian-Romanian friction is the Romanian province 
of Transylvania, which is important to the national myth of both nations. Transylvania 
was essential to the survival of Magyar culture during the centuries of Turkish 
suzerainty over the Hungarian plain. 1.6 million Magyars remain in the province as a 
result.199 Likewise, the Romanian intellectual revival began in Transylvania and spread 
to the other principalities in 1848 - 1866.200 Ethnic tension, including attempted 
Magyarization of ethnic Romanians, has been a part of life in the region for centuries. 
However, the transfer of Transylvanian ownership to Romania aggravated the situation 
by producing a territorial dispute as well. The Romanians originally followed an 
enlightened policy towards their newfound minorities. In December 1918, the 
Romanian National Assembly promised broad linguistic and cultural rights, but the 
state failed to live up to its pledges.20I Romania also signed the Treaty of Saint-
Gemiain ( 1919.) guaranteeing the rights and citizenship of all minorities acquired from 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The complicated problems of Transylvania went 
unaddressed at the end of the Second ·world ·war, despite American Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull's belief in the necessity to take action.2C2 The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty 
confinned Ron1anian ownership of Transylvania.=·:'" 
Romania and Hungary desire improved ties, including a bi-lateral state treaty 
re-affirn1ing what has already been stated in other international documents. "From the 
[Hungarian] point of view of establishing stable. cooperative neighborly relations with 
our neighboring states, prime importance is attached to strengthening economic, hun1a11 
rights and minority cooperation between our countries. The requisite basis for this can 
be provided by the new fundan1ental treaties, v.•hose positive effect is reinforced by the 
international agreements on conventional disarmament and confidence building, and by 
the bilateral agreements which regulate bilateral militai)' relations and also cover 
19~ennett Kovrig. "Hungarian Minorities in East-Central Europe," Oc=sional Paper Series: The Atlantic 
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confidence building measures. "204 Budapest and Bucharest understand the need to 
resolve their disputes as a prerequisite to full integration into European political. 
economic and security structures. However, tensions in Transylvania remain. "As long 
as historical controversies continue to dominate contemporary politics, Transylvania 
will be open to political manipulation by interests who have everything to gain from 
prolonging sterile quarrels and much to fear from the onset of a political agenda 
concerned with tackling problems that know no ethnic bounds. "2°5 
The development of a bi-lateral treaty has reached an impasse for two reasons. 
First, the Hungarians refuse to include provisions explicitly renouncing any future 
intentions to change the existing border arrangement, including the ownership of 
Transylvania. Hungary claims that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which prohibits 
territorial expansion by force, as well as the treaties of Trianon and Paris. adequately 
cover the issue. For its part. Romania points to the recently concluded Hungarian-
Ukrainian Treaty that includes an inviolability of frontiers statement. and wonders why 
the same can not be done in its case. The Romanian PDSR also wants an explanation 
for statements made by Hungarian officials which appear to back the need for such a 
clause. Lajos Fur, the Hungarian Minister of Defense in 1992. stated on the eve of 
Romanian parliamentary elections that "safeguarding Hungarians everywhere was an 
'inseparable facet' of the security of his nation. adding that the Hungarian government 
'should do everything in their power. using all legal and diplomatic means, to end the 
threat to the minorities and to guarantee their survival. "206 Although such statements 
are often made for domestic political purposes rather than for international reasons, 
they only provide more ammunition with which Romania's extremist parties can thwart 
warming Romanian-Hungarian relations. the improvement of which would be 
detrimental to the extreme nationalist cause. 
The second problem blocking a treaty is Romania's unwillingness to guarantee 
the collective rights of its Magyars, including the establishment of consulates in cities 
densely populated by Hungarian minorities, such as Cluj. 207 The Budapest government 
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recently passed an extraordinarily liberal minorities law208 for its citizens in an effort to 
foster the same liberal attitudes in states with Hungarian minorities, and has officially 
stated that "the national minority problem must be solved on a basis of internationally 
codified and legally binding norms and principles, with active international 
cooperation. [These issues] should not be treated exclusively as the internal affair of the 
country concerned, but as a question of security and human rights that affects the 
security of the whole region. "209 
Meanwhile, Romania has yet to sign the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Basic Freedoms or the European Charters on Self-Government. Regional 
and Minority Languages.210 Romania has been unwilling to pass legislation dealing 
with collective rights because it fears minority power, and firmly holds to the idea of 
allegiance to the state, as opposed to one Is ethnic group, as being the primary 
requirement for citizenship. Furthermore, "Romania suspects Budapest Is interests in 
and support for ethnic demands in Transylvania as interference in its domestic affairs 
and has never ceased to suspect Budapest of cherishing irredentist designs on 
Transylvania and the Banat. which were given to Romania under the 1920 Treaty of 
Trianon. "211 The minorities within Romania do have parliamentary representation, 
including a guaranteed seat in case a person of minority ethnic origin is not elected. 2
1 ::' 
However, Magyars have not e11ioyed true equalit:y· to date. 
The main problem in the ethnic controversy lies in the distorted image each 
ethnic community holds of the other. The Romanian lack of experience in handling 
minority problems has furtl1er exacerbated the situation. The revision of history for 
political expedience is the most fundamental basis for mistrust. Hungarians and 
Romanians share the blame for this equally. For example, each society holds that the 
otl1er consists of descendants of nomadic herdsmen coming from Asia or the Balkans. 
and tl1erefore considers the other inferior. 213 The ceremonial burial of Admiral Miklos 
Horthy in September 1993 is a more recent example of how history is construed 
differently by each party. The Romanians see Horthy. the Hungarian ruler in 1920-44, 
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as the embodiment of Hungarian irredentism since it was he who lost Transylvania in 
the Vienna Award. On the other hand, Horthy is considered somewhat of a national 
hero in Hungary, in recognition for his stance against Hitler in opposing the deportation 
of Hungarian Jews to the infamous death camps. The official Romanian reaction to the 
reburial was hostile, culminating in public commemoration of wartime mass executions 
of Romanian citizens by Hungarian troops.2 14 This move hardly impressed Budapest. 
Establishment of a Romanian Council of National Minorities on March 24. 
1993, was intended to help assuage Romanian Magyar concerns. One of the chief 
demands of the HDFR (the ethnic Hungarian political party in Romania) had been the 
creation of a ministry whose "expertise and goodwill would be focused on dealing with 
the specific problems of ethnic minorities. "215 The Council's charter states that its 
purpose is to "deal with judicial, administrative and fmancial matters related to the 
exercise of rights, liberties and duties of persons belonging to ethnic minority groups ... 
with the aim of fostering the conservation. development and expression of their 
cultural, linguistic and religious identity within the provisions of law. "216 
From the Council's inception. minority groups were wary of its true purpose. 
The phrase, 'within the provisions of law'. was taken by many to mean 'according to 
the will of Bucharest.' The misgivings of the minorities \\'ere rooted in their communist 
experience. Ceausescu often followed the tactic of "simulated change." meaning the 
setting up of bodies allegedly reflecting change. but lacking real power or the will to 
in1plement such change. Their fears were proven correct. The Council was originally 
established to impress the Council of Europe whose membership the Romanians had 
been seeking for years. The announcement also coincided nicely with the 
aforementioned appointment of ethnic Romanian prefects in Harghita and Covasna. 
\Vhether the Council was created exclusively for these purposes. or was later 
manipulated by the extreme nationalists is unknown. In any event, the Council quickly 
took matters into its own hands. Its by-laws and governing procedures were altered by 
the members so that. today. the Council acts free of central authority. 217 
214Ionescu and Reibch, "Still No Breah.-through .. ," p. 28. 
215shaf· · ""1. · · c· __,, " '5 , 11. ~~ 11101111es oun~u... p. _ . 
21 fibid .. p. 40. 
2t7Ibid. 
72 
The possibility for a treaty still exists, despite the grave misgivings on both 
sides. Both states realize that improved relations would positively affect regional 
stability and be beneficial economically. In light of this, both sides are continuing 
diplomatic efforts at reconciliation. Geza Jeszenszky, then the Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, visited Romania last September. During the visit, Mr. Jeszenszky stated that 
the "Hungarian government will never help or encourage ... those who might want to 
break inter ethnic harmony here in Transylvania. The common goal [of both nations] is 
to show that Romanians and ethnic-Hungarians can live together peacefully ."218 
President lliescu later responded by saying that "the only approach for a realistic 
politician is to recognize the present borders between states. Trying to solve all such 
[border] issues might take forever."219 Hungary's new government appears even more 
favorable to reform efforts, but the political realities in Romania can not be ignored. 
Improvements in bi-lateral relations is a positivs sign. Both sides will continue 
to seek regional ties in addition to Western support. The Western nations have avoided 
decisive involvement in Bosnia, and it is doubtful that a Transylvanian conflict would 
draw much sympathy for either Budapest or Bucharest. Removing the major obstacle to 
the treaty, Romanian minority rights. would solve several immediate crises. More 
comprehensive laws would help to resolve the concerns of the international community. 
Hungary, and the minority parties. If the minority parties and Hungarian officials 
would refrain from making rash statements, mainstream Romanians would be less 
likely to support the extreme nationalist parties. This would give lliescu a broader 
political base from which to begin real reforms. Hungary could help the process as 
well. Its stance on the inviolability· of borders has been criticized on several grounds. 
First, the clauses in the 1975 Helsinki accords were directed at Germany, so additional 
treaties make sense. Second, redundancy of treaties can do no harm if Budapest has no 
irredentist intentions. Finall:y. Hungarian territorial expansion would be ill-advised. The 
incorporation of 6 million Romanians and only 2 million Magyars (the population of 
Transylvania) would severely alter Hungary's demographic makeup (Hungary's 
population today. it \Vill be recalled. consists of 10.6 million people). A clause on the 
inviolability of borders would alleviate Romanian concerns, thereby reducing anti-
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Hungary has made significant advances in attaining a market economy based on 
private ownership since 1990. This has boosted the nation's overall economic 
conditions. Claims to the contrary fail to take into account the communist methods for 
deriving economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product and industrial output. 
l11e disparity between the old system and Western techniques (which were established 
in Hungary in 1992) makes it impossible to compare modern data with the days of 
central planning. The HSP' s recent electoral victory was a reflection of the public's 
negative perceptions of the country's economy. The reality of the situation is that 
today' s economy is not worse, but the people of Hungary now understand hov.· bad it 
really was. Private enterprises in Hungary have increased from 10.000 in 1990 to over 
200,000 in1994 and proprietorships have nearly reached 700.000 from 200.000 under 
communist reform.22 c' However. the state sector (primarily energy producers) still 
accounted for 77% of the Hungarian GDP in 1992.22 1 The restructuring of state-owned 
banks and enterprises prior to privatization has been a failure and has increased the 
government's long-term debt. Only a fraction of these businesses have been privatized 
to date. 22: 
The international market has always been important to Hungary's economy·. The 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistan<..--e (Civ1EA ). the \Varsaw Pact's trade group, 
accounted for 34 percent of the nation's imports and 31.9 percent of exports in 1 990. 
Furthermore. 43.:2 percent of the income from exports was used to service a $21.3 
billion foreign debt.:.::03 Hungary's dependence on foreign trade increased in 1992 \\'ith 
the lifting of European Union trade barriers as a result of the trade portion of 
Htmgary's association agreement. Today. Hungary attracts dose to 50 percent of the 
22 c'Karoly Okoli~~sanyi. "t\1anooconom:ic Changes in Hungary. 1990 - 1994," RFEiRL Research Report, 
Vol. 3, No. 24, 17 June 1994. pp. 21. 25. 
21 1Karoly Okolicsanyi. "The Hungarian State Sector's Dismal Performance." RFE/RL Resear·ch R~port. 
Vol. 3. No. 15, 15 Apri11994. p. 23. 
21
='Ibid .. p. 26. 
'!"') ~ ' ' II ; ' II "") ~-Okolicsanyt. Macroocononuc ... p. -1. 
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total capital flowing into the fonner communist countries because of tax incentives, 
low-cost labor, and relative political stability. In 1993 foreign investment and loans 
reached $8.6 billion, and Budapest's borrowing from the IMF did not approach its limit 
for the second straight year. Social welfare programs created under communism, such 
as government health insurance and pensions with a retirement age of 60, have 
perpetuated high budget deficits. "Despite its debt load, Hungary quickly gained the 
reputation of being more friendly to business than any of the other former communist 
countries, partly because it opened itself to foreign investment in a way that none of tl1e 
others did. Private businesses now have everything they require to operate efficiently 
and profitably, and they are doing so in an environment that is rapidly becoming 
similar to that in Western Europe. "22 4 
2. Romania 
The social and political problems in eastern Europe are closely connected to 
economic ones. Romania started its economic reform from an inferior initial position 
compared to that of the other former non-Soviet Warsa\l/ Pact states. The GNP per 
capita in Romania at the end of communism was only $2,290 (measured in 1989 US 
dollars) compared to $2,590 in neighboring Hungary. The GNP growth rate had also 
rapidly declined over the last several decades to 1.8%. A t\\'o-tier banking system was 
established in 1990, ending direct central bank involvement in commercial affairs; and 
privatization was begun in 1991. Bucharest was the last East European capital to 
implement both of these reforms. The initial price shock of refonn "turned out [to be] 
substantially larger than expected, but within si.x months of the program inflation came 
down to 2-3% per month in Poland, Czechoslovakia. and Hungary, "225 while 
Romania's monthly inflation rate never came below 10% (doubling the next closest 
state, Bulgaria). By the end of 1991, no other state's inflation was above 20%, while 
Romania's reached hyper-inflationary levels. The Romanian citizens were well aware 
of their economic circumstances compared to those in the other states.226 
Many factors hamper Romania's transition to a free market. "A critical problem 
is the transition from a relatively egalitarian and well endowed social welfare network 
to a market system in which all the income and wealth distribution problems. 
224Ibid .. p. 25. 
225Bruno. "Stabilization and Reform .. ," pp. 747.749,753 and 760. 
226Ibid. 
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unemployment risks, and other adverse social side effects of free capitalism suddenly 
emerge. '' 227 "The strongly conservative mood that prevailed in the omnipresent state 
sector during the long regime of Nicolae Ceausescu (1965 - 1989) discouraged the kind 
of economic experiments being tried in Hungary. "228 The lack of experience in 
implementing reform, both politically and economically, and the scarcity of resources 
and capital needed to modernize the business sector also inhibit the privatization 
process. As a result, Romania's economy relies heavily on credits from international 
lending institutions. The IMF is Romania's major foreign lender since the state can not 
afford Western interest rates. The credits Romania has acquired are used mainly to 
meet consumption demands and not to boost production or to service the $3.3 billion 
foreign debt.229 
Thus, ethnic strife is not the only difficulty Romania must contend v.·ith. 
Economic pressure will act in two distinct way·s. First, the already weak government 
will be forced to seek support from the political extremes to counter growing public 
animosity. Second, the ethnic minorities will feel not only the effects shared by other 
Romanians, but will also be forced to bear additional burdens because of unequal laws, 
discrimination, and the need for political scapegoats. The Romanian economic 
condition was a root cause of etlmic and nationalist tensions as early as tl1e mid-1980s. 
The sharp real wage cuts. the fall in living standards and the rise in unemployment 
since 1989 have fuelled etlmic prejudil--e. "The impending internal social problems in 
[Romania] will no doubt put all of the reform efforts to a serious test, as political 
democratization proceeds and the possibility of bliss recedes. "23 ':' 
C. INTERNATIO~AL ORGANIZATIOl\' ME1\1BERSHIP 
"The Central European states find that their greatest security threats emanate 
from internal developments. "2.3 1 Social tensions within states have led to cont1ict and 
instability within the region. as is the case between Romania and Hungary. The 
2271V1i.chael Bruno, "Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe; A Preliminary Evaluation." I!\1F Staff 
Papers. Vol. 39. No. 4, Doc. 1992, pp. 767- 68. 
228Dan lonescu, ''Romania's Standby Agreement with the L\1F," RFE RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 
18, 6 May 1994, pp. 21 - 26. 
229J:bid .. pp. 21 - 22. 
2.3Cl3runo. "Stabilization and Reform ... " p. 776. 
231Jiri Dienstbier, "Central Europe's Security," Foreign Policy, No. 83. Summer 1991. p. 126. 
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association with, and eventual full membership in, organizations such as NATO and the 
European Union is the main means by which these states seek to address their internal 
problems. "The principal objective [of association and membership] is to integrate the 
economies and particularly the societies of Central Europe into an economic. social, 
cultural, and political environment that by its very nature is conducive to the adoption 
of European standards and norms. "232 Hungary officially acknowledges this principle 
by stating that its security "rests on the premise that the EU, NATO. the CSCE, the 
Western European Union (\\'"'EUl, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the CoE 
[Council of Europe] will continue to play an active part in strengthening the region's 
economic and political stability, supporting reforms that point towards democratic 
conditions and a market economy and reforming the defense sphere, developing 
effective crisis and conflict handling mechanisms, rebuilding the region's system of 
international relations, and integrating it into the new European Security structure. "23-' 
The Romanian Foreign Minister also believes that "collective support- extended by 
organizations such as the EC, \VEl'. and NATO- should continuously complement 
bilateral relations"23 4 and are important in the continuance of democratic and free 
market transitions. 
1. NATO 
Hungary and Romania seek NATO membership as a result of ]\;A TO's 
"valuable contribution to the improvement of security and stability in Europe. ":::3:< and 
its preeminent position in the current European security structure because. its 
guarantees are backed by the t: .S .236 The core purposes of the alliam .. --e. "to maintain 
adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forn1S of 
pressure. to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. and to 
pursue tl1e search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which underly·ing 
:-:.:::Il"lid .. p. 127. 
:233"Basic Prinl"'iples ... " p. 355. 
234Anton I\.felescanu, "Security in Central Europe: a Positive-sum Game." ~ATO Review, October 1993. 
p. 15. 
2.'5NATO. "Statement Issued at the I\Ieeting of Defence Ministers at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 
25th May. 1994." Press Communique I\1-DMCP-1 (94) 39. p. 1. 
236Cirristian Catrina, "Partnership for Peace." Report for the VJ\ilDIR Conference "Transatlantic 
Relations and International Security. 22- 23 September 1994." p. 2. 
77 
political issues can be solved, "237 obviously would help the security of both states. 
Membership would also assuage Romanian fears of Hllllgarian irredentism since NATO 
also professes to provide security "based on the growth of democratic institutions and 
commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able 
to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat 
or use of force. "238 Furthermore, "NATO plays a crucial role [in] helping to manage 
ethnic and national conflict. "239 Thus, NATO represents the main guarantor of 
freedom, stability and security in Europe. 
The dilemma facing both Romania and Hllllgary is how to become full members 
of NATO. The alliance has set no specific criteria to date. However, there is a growing 
lUlderstanding in Bucharest and Budapest that membership may be contingent upon the 
quality of their bilateral relations. This has prompted both governments to "enlarge and 
deepen contacts and cooperation in all fields"240 as what some have called "window 
dressing" for the outside world. The real test of the strength of their relations resides in 
the ability to conclude a satisfactory bilateral treaty. It is possible that NATO officials 
will demand that "commitments be accompanied by capabilities and by clear 
demonstrations of political will "241 as a means of evaluating a prospective member's 
resolve to uphold its commitments to the alliance's basis of collective defense. Thus, 
deeds speak louder than words. Membership may not, however, be contingent mainly 
upon Romanian or Hllllgarian actions. Some analysts believe that "only in case of 
anarchy [in Russia] culminating either in autocracy or in further disintegration will 
NATO be amenable to confer upon Central European states the member status to keep 
the tunnoil av.•ay from its borders. on the eastern frontiers of Poland, Slovakia, and 
Hungary. "242 Therefore, Hllllgary and Romania must pursue policies aimed at NATO 
237NATO. "The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)." in NATO Facts and Figures, (Brussels: 
NATO Information Service, 1981), p. 288. 
238 NATO. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept: Agreed By the Heads of State and Government 
Part~--ipati.ng in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th- 8th November 1991," Press 
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\\'ashington D.C.). July 19~. p. 12. 
24 cMelescanu. p. 18. 
24 1James She1T, "Living \Vith Russia in the Post-Soviet Era." presented to the NATO Central Region 
I~~elligence & Security Conference. Brunssum. 8 - 9 July 1992. p. 9. 
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integration, even though membership may be contingent upon external factors beyond 
their control. 
2. PFP 
In the 1991 Rome Declaration NATO announced that it had "extended to the 
Central and Eastern European countries the hand of friendship and established regular 
diplomatic liaison. Therefore, as the next step, we [NATO] intend to develop a more 
institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security 
issues. "243 The Partnership for Peace (PFP) which resulted is conceived as a set of 
bilateral accords between NATO and states joining the PFP program. Romania became 
the first PFP state on 26 January 1994 and Hungary soon followed on 8 February. 244 
The PFP program is intended to enhance the political-military relationship 
between NATO and the PFP countries, thereby helping to promote regional stability 
and security as a side effect. The Partnership falls short of including members as allies 
within the framework of the Washington Treaty or acting as a guarantee for future 
membership. The program is "not intended as a venue for political consultations, 
except in the case of direct threat to territorial integrity. political independem .. --e or 
security. The more general security· dialogue shall take place within the N ACC. "=' 45 of 
which both Romania and Hungary are also members. Although PFP does not address 
all the Hungarian and Romanian needs. it nevertheless "provides at least some of the 
tools ... to help inculcate in others those ideas and attitudes. beliefs and practices, which 
[in Western Europe] have made possible enduring peace. "=~f 
243NATO. "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. ls&ued by the Heads of State and Government 
Parti..--ipating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Coun~--il in Rome on 7th - 8th November 1991." Pre&s 
Communique S-1 (91) 86. p. 4. 
24 4Catrina. p. 8. 
245Ibid. p. 6. 
:>16Robert E. Hunter. "New NATO :t\1embers \\'ill Be Producers of Security," Remarks by the 
Ambassador to The Pilgrims Society in London. 19 September 1994. 
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3. CSCE 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ( CSCEl, which opened 
at Helsinki on 3 July 1973, was initially founded to promote human rights and solidify 
the recognition of existing borders in Europe.247 Although initially aimed at preventing 
Soviet-Western conflict, the original tenets set forth apply to the current Hungarian-
Romanian problems as well. The CSCE' s realm of influence is continuing to expand in 
order to foster greater harmony between its members, including principles such as the 
right to free and fair elections, commitments to respect and uphold the rule of law, 
cooperation on environmental protection. and guidelines for economic cooperation 
focusing on the development of competitive market economies. 248 The organization's 
current High Commissioner on Minority Affairs believes that the CSCE has "a two-
fold mission: first, to try to contain and de-escalate tensions concerning minority 
issues. and second, to alert the CSCE whenever such tensions threaten to develop to 
such a level that I would not be able to contain them with the means at my disposal. ":24? 
Another strength of the CSCE is that it "can go places .KATO cannot. because it wields 
no military threat and includes all the states of Europe, North America and the former 
Soviet Union on an equal basis. It can shape its missions to suit specific situations, and 
its consensus procedures lend these missions credibility. ":5 However. the CSCE' s 
ability to int1uem.--e affairs is limited. The organization works on the unanimity 
principle. with every member holding veto power. Thus. the Romanians can 
legitimately stop any interference in Transylvania and the Hungarians can do like\vise. 
Yet, NATO and the CSCE "remain the foundation stones of today's Europe. "21 
Therefore. the CSCE is important to Hungary and Romania and can influence their 
relationship through addressing domestic problems. 
24
'"Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act Helsinki 1975." in John J. t\1aTesca, To 
Helsinki- The Conference on SecuritY and Cooperation in Europe 197 3 . 1975. Appendi'i. II. (Duke 
University Press, 1985). pp. 227.230 · 31. 
= 4 ~"The London Declaration on a Transformed ~orth Atlantic Alliance; Issued by the Heads of State and 
Govemment Partlcirnting in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5th-6th July 1990," 
United States Dtl-1artment of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. ·washington D. C.. July 1990, p. 4. 
24 ?J\Iax van der StoeL "Preventing Conflict and Building Peace: A Challenge for the CSCE." NATO 
Review. August 1994. p. 11. 
25 L'John J. Maresca, "An Important Role for an Evolving CSCE: Preventive Diploma~.;.·," Intemational 
Herald Tribune. 23 Aug. 1994. 
25 : "The Dream of Europax." The Economist. 7 Apr. 1990. p. 14. 
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4. WEU 
The Western European Union constitutes another security framework which 
Romania and Hungary would like to join, but its membership is even more exclusive 
than NATO's (since all of its members are also in NATO). "Conscious of the 
continuing necessity to strengthen western security and of specifically Western 
European geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions, the Ministers 
[at the 1984 Rome Summit] underlined their determination to make better use of the 
WEU framework in order to increase cooperation ... preserve peace, strengthen 
deterrence and defense and thus consolidate stability through dialogue and 
cooperation. "252 European crises, which might not be considered vital national interests 
to Washington, and therefore might not entail U.S. intervention, might include a 
downturn in Hungarian-Romanian relations. Thus, the WEU could become a powerful 
actor in preserving and promoting peace between Budapest and Bucharest. 
Hungarians firmly believe that integration with the West, actuall)· re-integration 
in their minds, will allow the state to solve its current economic and security problems, 
ushering in a new era of prosperity. Leaders from both sides of the political spectnu11 
in Hungary view integration with the West as the essential goal of foreign polic,y, 
although they disagree on the means of attaining their goal. This is not the case in 
Romania. 
Romania's political, economic, and social problems ( ind uding its treatment of 
minorities) could stop Romanian integration into the European fold. The turmoil 
surrounding Romania's entrance into the Council of Europe in September of 1993 is an 
example of what can occur to derail the integration process. The Council agreed to 
Romania's membership, provided that Bucharest pass additional legislation on several 
issues, including ones dealing with minority problems. The French government 
sponsored Romania's membership. arguing that membership would facilitate 
democratization and provide leverage (the threat of expulsion) in forcing Bucharest to 
comply with human rights standards. Romania gained unanimous acceptanee, with 
Hungary abstaining.253 HO\vever. the entire issue was perceived quite differently in 
Romania. 
252
''Rome Declaration," in The Reactivation of \VEt7. Statements and Communique& 1984 1987," (West 
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The political extremes (left and right) expressed grave reservations about 
acceptance of the membership terms. The nationalists were the most vocal, declaring 
that "the pride of the Romanian people, inherited from its Thracian ancestors, cannot 
be trampled on by [these] amendments. [The conditions] run counter to the customs and 
nature of the Romanian people, and even to Biblical precepts. "25 4 The media, which 
usually acts as an extension of the nationalists, propounds the idea that the West 
actually needs Romania because of its geopolitical position as a relatively stable state in 
a region of violent conflict. This attitude bodes poorly for the minorities since it 
removes any incentive the government has of following through with the 'mandatory' 
reforms. The HDFR, meanwhile, did everything possible to sabotage admittance until 
the demands of the minorities were met by the Bucharest government. Their actions 
culminated in a strongly worded message sent directly to the Council of Europe states. 
This move so infuriated the nationalists that they wanted to outlaw the HDFR as 
terrorists working for the Hungarian government.255 Once again. the three way 
domestic fight between Romanian nationalists, moderates and minorities hampers the 
state in carrying out programs deemed essential for acceptance by the \\lest. 
254Greater Romania Party as quoted in Dan Ionescu. "Romania Admitted to Council of Europe," RFEIRL 
Research Report. Vol. 2, No. 44. 5 Nov. 1993, pp. 44. 
"'""I d R . h "Still"' B---' .. t. h " .... .., ~ · onescu an e:tsc , ~ 'o I=.~>.uJI"Oug . . . p . .!. 1. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. ASSESSMENT OF PAST TRENDS 
The Romanian and Magyar (Hungarian) societies have interacted throughout 
their respective histories. Both cultures were greatly influenced by this relationship. 
They shared many common experiences, such as Turkish dominance and communism. 
However, these nations have been rivals since the Middle Ages and mutual animosity 
has developed as a result. The Trianon Peace Treaty (1920), which formally ended the 
First World War in East-Central Europe, compounded existing problems between 
Romania and Hungary. The Hungarian province of Transylvania was taken away by the 
allies and given to Romania as a reward for the latter state's alliance with the victors of 
the war. Transylvania was extremely important to Hungary's economic livelihood and 
represented nearly one-third of pre-war Hungary's total geographic territory. The 
Magyars suffered an emotional loss at Trianon as well. Over two million iv1agyars 
henceforth resided outside Hungary's borders. including over one million in 
Transylvania. 
l'vleanwhile. Romania was equally affected by its acquisition of Transy·lvania. 
The Trianon Peace doubled the geographic extent of Romania and introduced huge 
numbers of etlmic minority· citizens for the first time in the state's brief independence. 
Hard times ensued after the war, and the Bucharest government used these nev.· 
"foreign" citizens as scapegoats for the country's problems. New state mechanisms in 
Romania resulted in institutionalized discrimination. which still exists today. Romanian 
nationalism endorsed ethnic superiority as its basis. The trend toward bigotry continued 
throughout the many radical shifts in Romanian governments. The fact that fascists, 
monarchists. and communist regimes alike all treated Romania's minorities in a similar 
fashion reinforced the acceptability of discrimination by ethnic Romanian citizens and 
engendered a sharp cleavage within the country, which continues to exist after the 
downfall of communism in 1989. 
1. Hungary 
Hungary's his tOT)' and cultural traditions point at many common links with 
Vi/estern Europe. Hungary fimliy believes it is a Western nation left outside the fold by 
recent historical circumstance. The dominance of Catholicism and Protestantism in 
Hungary's religious community and the Germanic influence upon Magyar culture (as a 
result of Hungary's membership within the Austrian Empire) support this belief. Yet, 
these experiences are understandably overshadowed by the more recent involvement 
with communism. Hungary's traditional political, social and economic institutions were 
undeniably altered by communist rule. While Western nations may be sympathetic to 
Hungary's claims, they can not overlook what has transpired. Thus. Hungary. like the 
rest of East-Central Europe, must pursue its foreign policy objectives (security through 
Western association) based upon interests in addition to historical and cultural 
commonalities. 
The return of Hungary's former communist politicians to power in the June 
1994 election could impede the country's integration within the Western conununity. 
The election results could be perceived as representing an endorsement of the old 
socialist system, including the rejection of capitalism and democracy. by the general 
population. 'While the election results are disturbing. it is not out of concern for the 
potential return of communism in Hungary. The landslide victory gave the HSP 
unrestricted control of the nation politically. but the party seems disinclined to act too 
forcefully for fear of upsetting the fragile political stability which exists within the 
party and the nation as a whole. Thus it is in the socialists' interest to preserve 
Hungary's democratic institutions. 
The HSP's victory is widely seen as a reaction to the severity of economic 
reforn1 domestically. and the deadlock over Magyar rights internationally. These 
difficulties were blamed on policies pursued by the HSP's predecessors. The election 
results are also partly attributed to nostalgic feelings toward the welfare state. 
Hov.•ever, the HSP members represent a large segment of Hungary's current capitalist 
entrepreneurs. These people have the largest stake in seeing economic reforms come to 
fruition. The socialists, as a result of politics more than ideology. will have to make 
concessions to the working class by providing a larger welfare net. but returning to the 
state-run economy of the past appears doubtful. The real danger posed by the socialist 
return to power is the return of the client-patron system which crippled economic 
ilmovation and new political thought in the past. Such a system could once again 
corrupt the reform process and continue the stagnation of the nation's economy. This in 
turn could delay Hungary's i11tegration with the \Vest. 
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2. Romania 
Romania's cosmopolitan makeup has been a source of turmoil within the nation 
throughout the twentieth century. Romanian nationalism is built upon the concept of 
cultural superiority and its corollary, the denigration of foreigners and of minorities 
that are not ethnic Romanians. Loyalty to the state is the most important virtue 
expected of Romania's citizens. However, the loyalty of Romania's minority citizens is 
often called into question by their ethnic Romanian counterparts. The Mag_yars, 
Gypsies and other ethnic groups residing in Romania believe that the protection of their 
cultural identities requires collective or group rights. Without such rights their 
relatively small numbers will be absorbed, and their cultural roots overridden by the 
larger ethnic Romanian population. This appears to be a legitimate concern. The ethnic 
Romanians, on the other hand, believe that no such special privileges should be granted 
because collective rights would represent autonomy within the unitary state of 
Romania. This perspective is strengthened by the Romanian nationalist idea of cultural 
superiority and the fear of irredentist behavior by neighbors. Granting cultural 
autonomy to the Mag_yars is therefore seen as the first step toward their reunification 
with Hungary. 
Hyper-nationalism fans the flan1es of ethnic discontent in Romania. Both sides, 
the ethnic Romanians and the Magyars (\vhich constitute the only major ethnic minority 
remaining in Romania), have legitinute concerns about cultural rights and what 
citizenship entails. Their respective positions are not insurmountable in themselves. 
Common ground can be found from which acceptable solutions ending the hostilities 
could be reached. For example. Transylvania is home to all of the parties concerned, 
and their differences did not preclude working together to defeat the common enemy of 
communism in 1989. However. extreme nationalism promotes and is sustained by 
ethnic rifts. Ethnic strife provides membership and support vital to the perpetuation of 
these hyper-nationalist parties. Therefore, it behooves these groups to promote and 
perpetuate such tensions. 
Since the Romanian Nationalist Unity· Party's (PRNUJ support is necessary to 
maintain the governing coalition. it is extremely difficult for the moderate members of 
the coalition to enact laws aimed at ending disputes on even minor issues concerning 
minority rights. Whether such laws would be enforced by the local authorities appears 
doubtful. Furthermore. it appears that the extreme nationalist parties will remain 
integral to any government coalition in the foreseeable future. This legislative deadlock 
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effectively cancels any hopes for Romania's reconciliation with its minorities for some 
time to come. Meanwhile, anti-Magyar campaigns continue to sow discontent 
throughout society. 
3. Hungarian- Romanian Relations 
Hostility has existed between Romania and Hungary at varying intensities for a 
millennium. Expecting these two societies to trust and cooperate with one another 
simply because they have shed their communist burden is unreasonable. Both states 
have legitimate reasons to be skeptical of the other's intentions. The European 
revolutions of 1989 ushered in an atmosphere in which it was hoped that new relations 
devoid of past mistakes could be developed. Unfortunately. the subsequent years have 
proved that historical grievances can not be overcome that easily. 
Budapest has failed to convince Romania of Hungary's acceptance of the 
Trianon Treaty (1920) or its role as a minor European state. From Romania's 
perspective. Hungary's firm stance regarding non-Hungarian Magyars reflects two 
distinct irredentist trends. First, Hungary's overbearing concern is seen as a desire. and 
perhaps even a program. for the return of the "Greater Hungarian State" encompassing 
all lands upon which Mag,yars reside. The second trend is less extreme but equally 
disturbing to Romania. Hungary·'s insistem.'e upon clauses concerning tv1agyar rights 
has temporarily derailed the Hungarian - Romanian bilateral initiative. The question is 
whether Htmgary wants the process derailed or. at the very least. is using Magyar 
rights for leverage against clauses concerning the inviolability of borders. The most 
likely hypothesis is that Hungary is legitimately concerned for the welfare of the 
l'v1agyars and has no ulterior motives concerning the Magyar issue, yet Budapest has yet 
to take measures aimed at alleviating Romanian fears. Policies such as hiding behind 
the 1975 Helsinki Accords instead of approving a ne\v border inviolability clause 
undennine any chance at building up trust between the nations. Hungary must address 
its past irredentist policies during the Horthy period both at home and abroad. As a first 
step. Budapest needs to educate its citizens about the risks of a Horthyist policy in 
today' s international order \vhile simultaneously explaining to the world what has 
changed Vo'ithin Hungarian society since 1945 that has eliminated any need or desire for 
Hungarian reacquisition of Transylvania. Only then will states such as Romania take 
Budapest's ofticial word as the truth, without suspecting hidden agendas. 
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Romania's actions to improve its relations with Hungary have been 
unsatisfactory to date, but Hungary's approach simply exacerbates the dilemma. 
Bucharest wants the world to believe that Romania has changed since the fall of 
Ceausescu, but there is little of substance to prove these claims. Democracy of a sort 
does exist, but minorities are only grudgingly given a political voice. More 
importantly, there have been no attempts to transform the attitudes in Romanian society 
in general. Discrimination is an entrenched fact of life, and the government leads by 
example. Until this situation is rectified, there will be no improvement in inter-ethnic 
relations within Romania. 
Hungary should understand the political realities within Romania, and accept a 
slow process of reform in Romania in exchange for disavov.•ing claims on Transylvania. 
This would alleviate pressure upon the Bucharest government. and remove the basis of 
support for the extreme nationalist parties. If the nationalist choke-hold on Romanian 
politics could be removed, a moderate government unhindered by extremist 
philosophies could increase the pace of minority rights reform. Thus. the t\:o.'o countries 
are their own worst enemies as well as potential partners in removing the tensions that 
exist between them. 
B. PATHS FOR \\'ESTERN INFLCENCE 
The pros~ct of continuing antagonism in Hungarian-Romanian relations has 
vital re~rcussions for the rest of Europe. and to a lesser extent the linited States. The 
end of the Cold War removed the bipolar reality that existed in Europe for over forty 
years. The retum of a multipolar Euro~ seems certain in the wake of bipolarity. The 
Soviet presence in Eastem Europe prevented open hostility bet\:O.'een Romania and 
Hungary. but did little to address the root causes of the discord. The political and 
economic stagnation that was the legacy of communism exacerbated the situation. 
Today, conflict between tl1e two states remains a distinct possibility·. This 
conflict could take the form of diplomatic antagonism (such as efforts to block the 
rival's integration with \Vestem institutions l. economic non-cooperation or o~n war, 
the prospects of which are discussed at the end of this chapter. "Warfare in Eastem 
Europe ... might widen to include the major powers. because they would be drawn to 
com~te for influem.oe in that region. es~cially if disorder created fluid politics that 
offered opportunities for \:o.•ider i.nt1uence. or threatened defeat for friendly states. 
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Furthermore, because the results of local conflicts will be largely determined by the 
relative success of each party in finding external allies, Eastern European states will 
have strong incentives to drag the major powers into their local conflicts. "256 The two 
states also play important roles in preventing the spread of the Yugolsav war.257 and 
constitute potential sources for future waves of immigration that could disrupt Western 
Europe.258 Thus, the West should seek ways to prevent a future Romanian-Hungarian 
conflict. 
The lack of stability at home is the direct cause of the inability of both Hungary 
and Romania to address the issues existing between them in a spirit of compromise. 
Three factors are involved in creating this instability: political chaos, economic 
stagnation, and social ills resulting from the collapse of the communist welfare state. 
These three factors are so intertwined that no one factor may be dealt v.·ith individually. 
Progress in resolving these fundamental problems would create domestic stability and 
thus promote better bilateral relations. Therefore, the West should exert its influence in 
these areas in order to help remove the obstacles to more amicable relations between 
Hungary and Romania. 
Economic assistance represents the quickest means by which \\7estern nations 
could positively influence events. Hmvever. simply granting aid does not equate to an 
increase in economic vitality. Both Romania and Hungary lack the capitalist skills and 
cultural understanding necessary to invest aid \\'ith any reasonable assuram.--e of success 
without outside help. They also lack the political institutions and government 
mechanisms needed to oversee and manage an influx of large amounts of money. 
Romania's traditional resistan(.;e to outside interferen(.;e, coupled with its capitalist 
inexperien(.;e (relative to the other Central European states). diminishes the chan(.;e for 
the suc(.;ess of foreign aid. Hungary is slightly more promising. Hungary's past 
association with the West and its traditional acceptance of foreign participation in the 
resolution of domestic issues makes it a prime candidate for loans and investment at 
first glan(.'e. However. the temptations posed by foreign aid could engender tl1.e return 
of tl1e client-patron sy·stem in Hungary. the same system that socially and economically 
256J ohn J. Mearsheimer, "Back to The Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold \\'ar." Atlantic, 
~~gust 1990. pp. 33- 34 . 
...5 ·Teodor J\.1elascanu. "Security in Central Europe: A Positin Sum Game," NATO Review. October 
1993, p. 14. 
258F. Stephen Larrabee. "Down and Out in \Varsaw and Budapest: East Europe and East-\\'est 
Migration." International Security. Vol. 16. :\'o. 4. Spring 199~. pp. 7, 16- 18. 
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debilitated the fonner communist regime. Thus, while private investment could help 
both states recover their economic footing, large-scale investment of capital by foreign 
governments might be unwise until other, more pressing problems in Hungary and 
Romania are solved. 
Acceptance of Hungary and Romania into existing Western European 
organizations appears to be the best long term means of positively influencing relations 
between these two states. "A firm and even-handed attitude of support by the European 
states could make all the difference [in surmounting the difficulties resulting from the 
collapse of communist Europe]. "259 NATO membership is the primary goal of both 
Hungary and Romania. However, they should be reminded that NATO also has 
weaknesses and that membership is not a solution in itself. NATO recognized this fact 
in its Rome declaration: "The challenges ... cannot be ... addressed by one institution 
alone ... Consequently. we are working towards a new European security architecture in 
which NATO, the CSCE. the European Community, the \VEU and the Council of 
Europe complement each other. "260 All of these institutions offer varying degrees of 
effectiveness in dealing with Hungarian-Romanian problems. 
Several states and larger political entities have the ability to greatly influence 
Hungarian- Romanian relations: 
1. The United States and NATO 
There are many problems associated with admitting Hungary and Romania into 
NATO. The most serious challenge is the future role that organization envisions for 
itself. Proponents of full Hungarian and Romanian membership believe that this status 
will avert conflict and eventually promote improved relations, emulating what occurred 
bet\\'een F ranee and Germany, or the fragile peace that exists between Greel--e and 
Turkey. Detractors rightfully argue that using the alliance as a forum for preserving 
internal peace is tantamount to turning NATO into a collective security apparatus. 
Furthermore, excluding one or the other from membership could worsen current 
bilateral relations because the protection provided by membership could appear 
threatening to non-members. Partnership for Peace is intended to serve as a means of 
postponing the resolution of these inevitable issues while simultaneously helping the 
reforn1 process. 
25 SJ\,felescanu. "Socurity in Central Europe ... " p. 15. 
260
"Rome Docl.a.rntion on Peace and Cooperation," North Atlantic Council. 8 NO\'. 1991, p. 19. 
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It is likely that NATO will offer Hungary full membership as soon as that state 
meets whatever requirements are set by the Western leaders. Once Hungary is 
integrated within NATO, the political cost of attempting to retake Transylvania would 
far outweigh any potential benefit, and thus it is highly unlikely that Budapest would 
attempt to do so. Even if association with the West failed to deter Hungarian political 
attacks against Romania through diplomatic channels, NATO's ability to deter 
aggression through the use of force would remain. After all. Romania is a participant in 
the PFP program and therefore NATO is obliged to "consult with any active participant 
in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, 
political independence, or security. "261 This statement effectively extends consultation 
rights to PFP members similar to those articulated in Article 4 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. Thus, other NATO members could (at least in principle) take action against 
Hungary if Hungary were to attempt an occupation ofT ransylvania by force. The mere 
possibility of such a scenario would probably be enough to deter Hungarian 
irredentism. 
As a member of NATO. Hungary \vould probably continue its attempts to 
improve the status of the :Magyars \J.'ithin Romania. Membership would effectively 
make Hungary a "Western" nation. and give Budapest an equal voice with the other 
members of the Atlantic Alliance regarding the further expansion of this fraternity. 
Romania remains committed to \\'estern integration. and therefore a NATO-integrated 
Hungary could improve the status of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania by· using its 
newfound diplomatic leverage. Were Hungary to succeed in tlus endeavor. the easing 
of minority problems would break the chain of diplomatic posturing that currently 
hampers efforts to improve relations between the two states. Despite Romania's threats 
to the contrary. if Hungary was to be fully integrated into NATO first. there is little 
Bucharest could do but acr.:-ept it. Romania's associations with the other major European 
organizations, V.'hich are also important to economically and politically unstable 
Romania. would be jeopardized by any other reaction. 
NATO is tl1e main Western security institution in which C .S. influence is 
unquestioned. The lT .S. therefore has a direct means of helping to solve the Budapest-
Bucharest diplomatic logjam. Western Europe's perencial fear of an American 
disengagement could be used to galvanize support for Hungarian membership in 
':J': Ded.a.ration of the Heads of State and Go....-ernment Pal-ticipating in the ~feeling of the ~ orth Atlanti~~ 
Council Held at NATO Headquarters. Brussels. on 10- 11 Januan 1994. p. 5. 
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NATO. In the meantime, clauses requiring the nev.' PFP partners to bear the principal 
costs of the program could be lifted to help these struggling nations. Slow expansion 
into select states, in place of engulfing the entire PFP region, would assure states such 
as Turkey (which is currently concerned with the Russian buildup in the neighboring 
Caucasus region) that NATO will still be able to meet its collective defense 
commitments. This policy would also avoid the risk that accepting all of the PFP 
participants would dilute NATO's security assurances and hence its attractiveness to the 
new countries. Instead, the security and prestige which membership brings would 
provide a framework for prosperity and political stability in Hungary. A politically and 
economically successful Hungarian state would provide Romania with a large stable 
frontier and a nearby trading partner, both of which would be beneficial in Romania's 
own quest for Western integration. 
Finally. the Yugoslav situation has shown that only the United States is capable 
of leading NATO into the future. If America takes a passive approach to NATO 
expansion, it is likely that the alliance will end up with a policy in which it responds to 
grave problems belatedly instead of addressing them before they reach crisis levels. 
Reactive crisis management is rarely as good as a thought-out, goal-oriented approach. 
If NATO is to expand, it should do so with a purpose. That purpose should be the 
fostering of stability in the new regions. 
2. \\'estern Europe 
As stated before. NATO membership by itself would not ensure the 
improvement of Hungarian-Romanian bilateral relations. "The NATO experience has 
shown ... that the political strengths of a voluntary alliance of sovereign governments 
can entail functional weaknesses. NATO has no supranational authority: r\ A TO's 
international staff assists in the coordination of alliance activities but has no directive or 
coercive powers. Most alliance decisions are made through consensus on the basis of 
lowest-common-denominator judgments acceptable to all the member governments and 
their publics. "262 Thus, it behooves \\7estern nations to fully integrate Hungary and 
Romania into the other European institutions (including the Ell, once the countries can 
achieve set standards for admission). Through the exchange of information between 
Hungary and Romania as well as the rest of Europe, mutual awareness and 
""" ·""DavidS. Yost. "NATO's Politll."3.1-~filitary Challenges." Cun-ent Histor:y. Vol. 81, ~o. 479, Doc. 
1982. p. 401. 
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llllderstanding can be fostered; and thus the root problems of mistrust and 
discrimination can be resolved. Centuries of animosity will not be erased overnight. but 
close association will eventually create a new envirorunent in which their differences 
can be addressed. 
Social issues should be addressed through institutions intended to deal with 
those problems (such as the CSCE and UNl, not by classical security organizations 
responsible for the physical protection of its members (such as NATO). There are 
many examples of how this can be achieved. The CSCE could conceivably "tackle 
transnational challenges, such as mass migration, pollution and drugs, "26
3 in addition to 
continuing programs such as the Office for Free Elections. Finally, economic assistance 
in the form of managerial and investment expertise as well as limited capital should be 
conditioned on compliance with established norms of behavior such as the protection of 
human rights, including minority rights. the perpetuation of democratic ideals, and the 
ac~;.'eptance of the inviolability of borders. Economic assistance is a vital ingredient in 
solving the current logjam. 
3. Germany 
Germany (and to a lesser extent Austriai wields significant influence in Romania 
and Hungary. German economic power is admired by both states. Romania respects 
Germany's industrial capacity as a result of its O\\'n experiem'e in dealing with its ethnic 
German population as well as watching the modern German state. Hungary's long 
(albeit bittersv.•eetl association with Vienna also remains a factor. Germany. and not 
NATO or the other European organizations. may represent the most coveted association 
of all. l\lembership in a German economic sphere could potentially provide security 
through economic strength and importance. The Visegrad countries "will cease to be 
attractive partners for each other at the moment when the robust suitor. Germany, 
arrives on the scene. Once Germany appears they [the Central European states] will fall 
over each other. [each state] demanding that they be chosen and not one of the 
others. "='64 Gern1any' s influence should be used in a fashion similar to that of the rest of 
263Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends." Survival, 
Spring 1992. p. 48. 
264 Lasz16 Lengyel. "Europe Through Hunga.r1an Eyes.'' trans. GeorgeSch6pilin. lntemationalA.ffa.irs. 
Vol. 66. ~o. 2. Apri11990. p. 291. 
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Western Europe. Indeed, the German govennnent will probably coordinate closely with 
its EU and NATO partners. 
The results of excluding Romania from any economic participation \\'Ould be 
devastating. A bilateral economic agreement between Germany and Hungary would 
appear very threatening to Romania from a security standpoint, if no comparable 
accord was made with Bucharest. This prospect would likely push Romania into the 
Russian sphere, or it could even bring about the explicit return of authoritarian 
government as a defensive backlash. Both scenarios could entail massive instability· 
within the country. Instability within Romania traditionally hurts the minorities most. 
This would worsen Hungarian-Romanian relations and indirectly involve Germany in 
the dispute. Thus, the exclusion of Romania could have the snow ball effect of creating 
massive regional instability. German actions through intermediary groups such as the 
WEU appear less threatening, and the risks are more equitably distributed. Therefore. 
the United States and the European Union should attempt to encourage Germany to 
continue to operate within the framework of European institutions, or at the very least 
to include both Hungary and Romania in any future dealings. 
4. Russia 
Russia remains an important player in Hungarian-Romanian affairs by virtue of 
recent history, trade links and geopolitical realities. The crisis in Moldova, which pits 
Romania and Russia as adversaries. gives Russia another inroad into Romanian affairs. 
Although Russia today is a weakened state. it has traditionally been a major broker in 
Central European affairs by balancing against German and Austrian interests. Russia's 
influence is undeniable and therefore could have a role in resolving Hungarian-
Romanian tensions. The \Vest. owing to its economic strength, currently· has a greater 
ability to s\·vay Moscow's official foreign policy than ever before. This influence should 
be asserted so that Russia follows the \Vest's lead in defining what is acceptable 
behavior by Hungary and Romania. At the same time, Russia's disavowal of any 
military interest in the region. through words and deeds. would alleviate Romanian and 
Hungarian fears and moderate the conviction that they must join the ·western fraternit:v 
of nations nov.•. while Russia is weak, or else lose the opportunity entirely. Such 
actions would lessen the security anxieties that presently drive the foreign policies of 
Budapest and Bucharest. 
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C. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION 
Cooperation will occur only if both states back away from current posturing and 
follow amicable policies promoting reconciliation. Irredentism and minority rights 
disputes are essentially stalemating the bilateral treaty negotiations. Progress in both of 
these arenas could be instigated internally or through external forces. Future 
cooperation requires the current gridlock between the two states to end. 
Hungary must irrevocably accept the inviolability of borders and refrain from 
intervening in Romania's minority affairs if the current leadership in Bucharest is to be 
satisfied. Today~ Hungary accepts Transylvania as Romanian territory. "We [Hungary] 
are firmly resisting all aspirations aimed at the forceful change of the borders and an 
artificial transformation of national composition. "265 Tackling the problems existing 
within the contemporary Hungarian borders is difficult enough without attempting to 
take on the additional responsibilities resulting from any re-incorporation of 
Transylvania. This is not to say that Hungarian irredentism is a myth. Elements of 
Hungarian society certainly advocate the return of a Greater Hungarian state. Ho\:vever, 
as Hungary becomes more engaged in European associations the likelihood of Budapest 
attempting to reconstitute such a state diminishes because the costs simply become too 
great. Hungary's cultural acceptance of being a secondary power and its conviction that 
it is a Western nation mean that it will attempt to act as such. Furthermore, Hungary 
would not jeopardize the security such relations with the \Vest give while residing in 
such a volatile region. 
Convincing Romania of this is another matter. Only time can dispel Romania's 
deep-seated mistrust of Hungarian intentions. The extreme nationalist parties will 
continue to have little trouble playing upon Romania's cultural fears to obtain political 
support. These same nationalist parties will prevent Romania from accepting anything 
less from Hungary than explicit treaties renouncing irredentist intentions. Eventually, it 
may be hoped, Hungary's acceptance of a border inviolability clause will occur. given 
the HSP' s agenda and political strength. This could lead to the signing of the bilateral 
treaty, but it would probably not dispel Romanian concerns about irredentist intentions 
in HLmgary. The Greek-Turkish example shov.·s that even common membership in 
security organizations is unlikely to settle the issue. The antagonisms surrounding 
265
"Basic Prin-.-i.ples of the Security PolR')' of the Republic of Hungary," EurQI?ean Security, Vol. 3, No. 
2 (Summer 1994), p. 353. 
border issues will continue, albeit contained from escalating to open conflict as a result 
of integration into major Western institutions such as NATO and the EU. 
Bucharest would also like to see an easing of minority rights demands by 
Romania's Magyars and Hungary. This will not occur as long as Hungary remains 
democratic. The HSP discovered in the last elections the strength of kinship between 
the Magyars. Despite campaigning against the previous government's preoccupation 
with Magyar rights to the detriment of other policy goals, once in power the HSP 
learned it had to continue these policies in order to maintain public support. The 
Hungarian population's general mistrust of government is a major concern for domestic 
stability, even for a political party with such an overwhelming electoral victory. 
Hungary will probably remain democratic in part because of this mistrust, but also 
because opposition groups and a multi-party system have taken root in the nation's 
politics. The current government, v.·hich has the power to retard democratic reform, 
will probably not do so for fear of a domestic uprising similar to that in 1956. The state 
no longer has the po\ver or a powerful ally to quell such an uprising and to maintain 
control without popular support. 
External forces offer a greater chance of changing Hungary's current stance on 
minority rights in Romania. Hungary's integration into Western institutions would 
provide the nation with a feeling of security from which it could truthfull)· address its 
own history, possibly at the urging of its new partners through friendly encouragement 
or economic incentives. Once Hungary takes stock of its own history. perhaps it will be 
more understanding of Romanian attitudes. A less judgmental approach to the problem 
would eliminate much of the verbal ammunition used by Romania's extreme 
nationalists and provide the moderate politicians more maneuvering room with which to 
address minority issues. Unfortlmately, there is no guarantee that the easing of demands 
would help the moderates. especially if Romanian bigotry toward minorities is so 
deeply rooted as to prevent any reform. Therefore it is doubtful that even Western 
influences can surmount Hungary's self-appointed mission to help the Magyars abroad, 
and Budapest will probably continue present policies. 
The odds of a change in Romanian attitudes towards minorities are equally 
bleak. The fact that popular history made up the foundation of the Romanian national 
myth long before communism took root illustrates that there are no simple solutions to 
these minority problems. The suspicious nature of all of the major ethnic groups 
residing in Romania makes it extremely difficult to find common ground from which to 
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work. Ending the escalation of the war of words being waged by all sides would 
constitute a victory. Any program aimed at relieving ethnic tensions will fail unless 
some fundamental steps are taken by all of the parties involved. Domestic peace will 
only be possible when economic and political reform are realized. None of these 
measures can occur as long as the government reliance upon the hyper-nationalist 
parties continues. Romanian cultural factors also resist change and simultaneously 
strengthen the extreme nationalist movements. Even were legislation enacted to ease 
minority persecution, the central government is ineffective in curtailing the ability of 
local authorities to circumvent such legislation. The failure of democracy could -
paradoxically - help to improve inter-ethnic relations by giving the central government 
a greater capability to enforce its policies. However, Romania's history suggests that an 
authoritarian regime friendly to the minorities is doubtfuL and such a government 
would probably increase discriminatory practices. 
Romanian integration into Western institutions would affect ethnic affairs within 
the state positively. Such integration would give the Romanian minority parties 
significant leverage in the political arena. These parties have parlayed their ability to 
influence foreign opinions concerning Romanian domestic strife (and thus Bucharest's 
suitability for membership within the Western organizations) into tangible minority 
programs. Probably the greatest evidence of the positive effect prospective membership 
has had resides in the vehemence with which Romania's extreme nationalists have 
viewed such integration. The nationalists see membership as being detrimental to their 
agendas, which include the perpetuation of ethnic animosity in order to gain a larger 
political following. However, the influence of Western institutions is also limited. 
Western Europe can not stop the bigoted views and actions of local Romanian 
administrators who carry out the daily functions of the state. Educational programs 
established with the goal of enlightening Romanian attitudes \~.:ill be countered by 
hyper-nationalist propaganda. The people will probably trust Romanian nationalists 
before accepting the word of outsiders who seek to dispel established "facts." Thus, it 
is doubtful that Romanian admission into Western institutions will remove minority 
tensions to a level acceptable to the West. 
96 
D. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CONFLICT 
A military conflict between Hungary and Romania is unlikely. War is a costly 
endeavor and neither state has the economic or military capability to reasonably assure 
victory. The relationship between the Romanian and Hungarian military establishments 
is more positive than that of their political counterparts. Military relations have been 
good even during periods of political strain.266 Therefore, pressure for conflict will not 
come from the generals. The wishes and actions of the people and their political leaders 
represent the greatest danger to peace. 
An attempt by Hungary to retake Transylvania could be precipitated by an 
increase in domestic violence in Romania. As noted before. an increase in anti-minority 
violence is a real possibility if democratic reforms fail in Romania. However, economic 
success, which is important to Hungary's leadership and general population alike, is a 
more pervasive influence than Magyar kinship. Budapest realizes that economic success 
hinges upon Western aid and that the West would frown upon such irredentist activity. 
Furthermore, the social and economic chaos resulting from the incorporation of several 
million ethnic Romanians, as well as a million Magyars whose loyalty to the Hungarian 
state is doubted by some,267 makes the incorporation of Transylvania far less attractive. 
Therefore, a Hungarian invasion is extremely unlikely. Budapest's real goal is to 
improve the lot of the Magyars"·ithin the Romanian state. 
Armed conflict approaching civil war within Romania is another distinct 
possibility. Bucharest will not allo\v any revolt by the Magyars in Romania that could 
conceivably threaten the unitary state, including :Magyar self-declared autonomy. If 
such a confrontation turned violent. the logical source of support for the Romanian 
1\-lagyars would be Hungary. While Budapest \\'ould be unable to actively intervene in a 
Romanian civil war for fear of escalating the conflict (and the West's response to such 
involvement), it could not remain v.·holly detached, in view of the widespread 
sentiments of kinship for the Magyars. Private transfers of arms and aid (including 
troop volunteers) might be tolerated by a Budapest government for fear of losing its 
popular mandate. However, an actual government-sponsored intervention would not 
occur for tl1e same reasons that hold Hungarian irredentist inclinations in check. The 
Hungarian government would probably enact official policies geared towards 
'Jf,f.Slai"' "Etl ' T ' R " ')A ~- ·, 1 u. lllK' ens1on uns ... p . ...,.., 
")f.7 ' II IJ ""' 
-- Schopflin. Roundtable ... p. 3_, 
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containing the war, while simultaneously seelcing a favorable diplomatic end to the 
conflict. War atrocities, which occur frequently during inter-ethnic struggles. could 
provide an avenue by which Hungary could be drawn into a Romanian civil war. Some 
Western observers might be persuaded to condone Hungarian intervention in such 
circumstances. However, pinpointing the blame in wartime is difficult, and Western 
support (or at the very least, indifference) would probably depend upon proving 
criminal actions on the part of Romania. There is also a chance that the Hungarian 
reaction to atrocities against Magyars at the grass roots level would overwhelm other 
policy considerations and virtually dictate Hungary's entrance into the war. Thus, as 
long as the possibility of Romanian internal conflict remains plausible. so too does the 
possibility of a Hungarian-Romanian war. 
Hungarian-Romanian relations will improve as Hungary and Romania become 
more deeply integrated into the Western community of nations. This improvement may 
not mean friendship between the two states, but a better working relationship 
necessitated by a common need to become integrated with the \Vest. The signing of a 
bilateral treaty between the two states would allow them to work together for common 
causes. regardless of whether Romania continues to follow the path of democrac)'. 
Ho\\'ever. the difficulties dividing the two countries are too great to be resolved in a 
single generation. Conflict in the form of diplomatic posturing and verbal jousting may 
continue as before, but the threat of anned combat has subsided with the increase of 
Western influence in the region. 
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